Operation Jackpot () was a codename for three operations undertaken by the Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) against Pakistan forces at the climax of the Bangladesh War of Independence.
After the Pakistani Army drove the Bengali armed militancy across the Indian border at the conclusion of Operation Searchlight, the Indian Army implemented a supply and training operation for the Mukti Bahini from 15 May 1971, with the goal of sending an ever increasing number of trained fighters to attack Pakistani forces and sabotage military and economic assets to demoralize Pakistani soldiers and disrupt their supply network. This enterprise was dubbed "Operation Jackpot".
Mukti Bahini naval commandos launched several sabotage efforts in the cities of Chittagong, Chandpur, Mongla, and the Narayanganj District against the combined operating forces of the Pakistan Army, Pakistan Marines, Pakistan Navy SEAL Teams, and the East Pakistan Security Forces on the night of 15 August 1971. Bengali submariners who had defected from Pakistani submarine PNS Mangro (S133), then based in Toulon, France, led the attacks, and this is also known as part of Operation Jackpot.
The third operation was designed by Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh, commander of the Indian Army IV Corps, attached to the Eastern Command, and the Bangladesh forces operating in his operational area. These forces fought against the Pakistani forces in Sylhet, Comilla, and Chittagong as part of the overall campaign from 21 November to 16 December 1971.
Background After the postponement of the session of the National Assembly of Pakistan, the High Command was authorised by the Yahya administration to launch the military operation (codename: Searchlight and Barisal) in March 1971 in a view of curbing political opposition instigated by the Awami League– which had won majority in the 1970 elections, and would have formed next civilian government of Pakistan had the Army not intervened. The Pakistani Armed Forces launched Operation Searchlight on 25 March 1971 in a bid to take control of East Pakistan and subdue all resistance (political or otherwise) against the West Pakistani authorities. By mid-May, the Pakistani authorities in East Pakistan, with the crucial support provided by the Pakistani military, had been in control of maintaining the writ of government in major areas of East Pakistan, and the Mukti Bahini, under attack from the Pakistani Air Force and armed military units, started to retreat across the border into India. By the middle of June, the Pakistan Army had driven the remnants of Bengali army and paramilitary units, who had been supported by the civilians, across the border into India. The Mukti Bahini, formed around the defecting Bengali soldiers with civilian volunteers, started a guerrilla campaign.
Prelude The central government in India decided to open its Eastern border with East Pakistan on 27 March, and started to admit millions of Bengali refugees and political dissidents into India, housing them in specialized camps. After the crackdown, Tajuddin Ahmad met with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 3 April 1971 and asked for all possible aid,Hasan, Moyeedul, Muldhara 1971, pp. 11–14 by which time the Indian government had already opened the Indian-East Pakistan border and the Border Security Force (BSF) was offering aid to the Bengali resistance. The Bangladeshi government in exile was formed by the Awami League leadership on 17 April at Meherpur in Kushtia, which confirmed Col. M. A. G. Osmani as commander of the Mukti Bahini (regular armed forces and insurgents) under the authority of Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmad. Since March 1971, the local supply of weapons and ammunition was initially overseen by India's BSF, and the BSF had even made disorganized incursions in Bangladesh with little success. On 15 May, Indian Army Eastern Command took over the task of training and supplying the Mukti Bahini; this was aided by the support teams of BSF.
Indian Army dubbed the operation to support Mukti Bahini's "Operation Jackpot", setting up a coordinated enterprise under the Eastern Command to meet the material support, logistical, and training needs, and, to some extent, lend operational support and various planning advices.
The operational setup and execution of plan
The Indian logistical sectors for this operation were: Alpha (HQ: Murti Camp, West Bengal), C.O. Brig. B. C. Joshi. Bravo (HQ: Rajgaunj, West Bengal), C.O. Brig. Prem Singh. Charlie (HQ: Chakulia, Bihar), C.O. Brig. N. A. Salik. Delta (HQ: Devta Mura, Tripura), C.O. Brig. Sabeg Singh. Echo (HQ: Masimpur, Assam), C.O. Brig. M. B. Wadh, co-ordinating logistics. Foxtrot (HQ: Tura, Meghalaya), C.O. Brig. Sant Singh.
Through this network, Mukti Bahini forces communicated with the headquarters of the Mukti Bahini exiled in Kolkata and coordinated all supply, training and operational efforts for the war. Lt. Gen. J. S. Aurora, commander of Eastern Command, was overseeing the entire operation.
Effectiveness and importance
At the beginning stage of the Jackpot, the operation was crucial in sustaining the activities of the Mukti Bahini, which had engaged in a series of insurgent attacks and sabotage all over (then) East Pakistan, and their success debunked the Yahya administration's claims of successfully establishing peace and stability in the Eastern region, as news of the insurgency was picked up and publicized by the international press. The Indian Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) was well aware of the Navy SEALs and the Army Special Forces, and therefore planned a careful operation with the Mukti Bahini leadership to launch a series of attacks to sabotage the civil and military infrastructure, inflict casualties on Pakistani forces, and demoralize the Pakistan Armed Forces before the Indian Army officially engaged both the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Navy in East Pakistan.
Despite limitations and challenges rising from the state of the Indian transport network, availability of supplies, differences of opinion of guerrilla training methods and the decision of the Bangladeshi government to train the maximum number of guerrillas in the shortest possible time, Which may have caused supply shortages and often arming of only 40% to 50% of the newly trained guerrillas with firearms, The Bangladeshi government in exile managed to field 30,000 regular troops and 100,000 guerrillas and run a campaign that would destroy or damage at least 231 bridges, perform 122 acts of sabotage on railway lines and 90 electric stations, disrupting the logistical/supply system of the Pakistani forces, and kill at least 237 officers, 136 JCOs and 3,559 soldiers of the regular army during April to November 1971, and an unspecified number of Police, West Pakistan Rangers, EPCAF and Razakar members, and wound several thousand soldiers. The success and intensity of guerrilla operations after August had also lowered the morale of the Pakistan Army, and by November, they chose to remain in their bases whenever possible, and the contribution of the guerrilla warfare to the final victory was enormous despite the numerous challenges.
Background: naval commandos At the conclusion of Operation Searchlight and Operation Barisal, the Pakistani Army and Pakistan Navy had driven the Mukti Bahini into India, where they entered a period of reorganization during June and July 1971 to train guerrillas and set up networks and safe houses in the occupied territories to run the insurgency and rebuild the conventional forces. M. A. G. Osmani divided the country into 11 sectors. He planned to send 2,000–5,000 guerrillas inside Bangladesh every month with 3/4 weeks of training to hit all targets of opportunity, while building up the regular force to seize territory in Sylhet,Hasan, Moyeedul, Muldhara 71, pp. 53–55 Indian officials suggested fielding a force of 8,000 guerrillas with regular troops in leadership positions with three or four months of training. The solution was to activate the hitherto inactive Sector No. 10 as a special sector for naval commandos with Col. Osmani in charge from 13 May onwards. This naval commando force was to be trained as per the Indian suggestion, acting as an elite force for attacking riverine and seaborne targets.
Col. Osmani's initial strategy of sending 2,000–5,000 guerrillas inside Bangladesh every month since July and hitting the border outposts with regular battalions had not yielded expected results for various reasons. By July–August, Pakistani commanders were confident that they had contained the "Monsoon offensive" of the Mukti Bahini. As the pace of military operations in Bangladesh slacked off, civilian morale was adversely affected, which prompted East Pakistan administrative authorities to claim that the situation had returned to "normal". In response to this declaration, the Mukti Bahini launched 2 operations: (1) Guerrilla attacks in targets in Dhaka by a crack commando group trained by Major ATM Haider (ex-SSG commando), and (2) the simultaneous mining and damaging of ships in Chittagong, Chandpur, Mongla and Narayanganj on 15 August, which became known in Bangladesh and international media as "Operation Jackpot".
Mukti Bahini riverine activity Bangladesh is crisscrossed by numerous wide rivers and, during the April–October monsoon flooding, about 300 additional navigable channels. The movement and logistics of the Pakistan Army largely depended on their control of the inland waterways and the seaports. Mukti Bahini did not operate a separate naval wing during March–June 1971. River craft were requisitioned as needed. The Pakistan Navy and Pakistan Air Force sank one such craft, MV Ostrich, during Operation Barisal on 26 April, while Pakistani gunboats sank 3 boats commanded by Mukti Bahini on 5 May 1971, at Gabura.Islam, Rafiqul, Muktijuddher Itihas, p. 244,
Pakistan naval preparations The importance of waterways was not lost on Pakistan Eastern Command. After the launch of Operation Searchlight and the successful conclusion of Operation Barisal, General A. O. Mittha (Quarter Master General of Pakistan Army) had recommended the creation of a port operating battalion for Chittagong, in addition to a separate River Transport and River Marine Battalion to operate an augmented Cargo and Tanker flotilla. These steps were not implemented; the Army commandeered civilian watercraft for logistics and posted Army and Razakar personnel to guard various ferries, bridges, ports and other naval installations. Pakistan Navy established a Marine Academy in June 1971 to support riverine operations.Pns Qasim
Rear admiral Mohammad Shariff had only 4 gunboats (PNS Comilla, Rajshahi, Jessore and Sylhet) and a patrol boat (PNS Balaghat) in East Pakistan, while the navy remodeled 17 civilian ships into gunboats by adding 12.7/20 mm guns, and .30/.50 caliber Browning machine guns. These boats joined the fleet by August 1971, while several other boats had been fitted with 40X60 mm Bofors guns and .50 calibre machine guns in Khulna and Chittagong dockyards to serve as patrol boats. A few hundred officers and 2,000 crewmen were posted in East Pakistan in 1971. 300 Bengali seamen were transferred to West Pakistan as a precaution after 25 March 1971, while Special Service Group Navy (SSGN) teams were posted in East Pakistan under Commander David Felix.
Naval commando training and preparations