Fear and Trembling () is a philosophical work by Søren Kierkegaard, published in 1843 under the pseudonym Johannes de silentio (Latin for John of the Silence). It is widely regarded as one of Kierkegaard's most influential texts and a foundational contribution to the philosophy of religion and existentialism.
The work is an extended meditation"Fear and Trembling comprises a sustained meditation on the Hebrew patriarch Abraham, whom Johannes recommends to his readers for urgent reconsideration. His avowed aim in doing so is to mobilize Abraham in the service of his campaign to address the spiritual crisis that afflicts European (or at least Danish) modernity." Daniel Conway, "Introduction," in Kierkegaard's "Fear and Trembling": A Critical Guide, ed. Daniel Conway, Cambridge Critical Guides (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 2. on Genesis 22, also known as the Binding of Isaac. Johannes de silentio examines the tension between ethical duty and faith through an analysis of Abraham's psychological state during his journey to Moriah. The text argues that it is impossible to understand Abraham's actions through the ethical framework of Hegel's philosophy. Rather, the actions can only be understood through a distinct category—faith.
The title references Philippians 2:12, "continue to work out your salvation with fear and trembling". The Philippians verse is thought to reference Psalm 55:5.
Summary The work starts with an "Exordium", or prologue that presents four different retellings of the Binding of Isaac.Silentio, "Exordium," in Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric. In each, Abraham is prepared and willing to follow God's command to sacrifice Isaac, but something goes wrong. Abraham or Isaac loses faith, or Abraham is overcome with guilt. Silentio does not consider any of these retellings of Abraham to have genuine faith, which establishes that willingness to obey God does not constitute faith on its own.
The "Exordium" is followed by the "Eulogy on Abraham", in which Silentio recounts Abraham's life and accomplishments, praising him as the "father of faith".Silentio, "Eulogy on Abraham," in Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric. The emphasis of the section is that the greatness of Abraham is not just in his willingness to sacrifice Isaac, but also his belief that God would either not require it or restore him. Faith is what distinguishes Abraham from other figures associated with sacrifice or loss.
The "Preliminary Expectoration" introduces the central distinction of the work: the difference between faith and infinite resignation.Silentio, "Preliminary Expectoration," in Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric. Silentio uses knights as examples of the contrast between the two positions. The knight of infinite resignation renounces what he loves and accepts the finality of the loss. On the other hand, the knight of faith is able to make an additional movement beyond the finality. Silentio describes the move as being made "by virtue of the absurd". The knight believes that he will receive back what he has given up, or be restored and made whole in some way. Silentio admits that he can understand infinite resignation, but not faith. The admission serves as introduction to the three Problemata that make up the rest of the text.
Central argument
The core claim of Fear and Trembling is that it is impossible to understand Abraham through rational ethical thinking. Using frameworks of Greek philosophy or Hegel leads to a reductio ad absurdum. Silentio's argument is that either there exists a category that must transcend ethical reasoning, or faith does not exist."If this is not faith, then Abraham is lost, then faith has never existed in the world precisely because it has always existed. For if the ethical—that is, social morality—is the highest and if there is in a person no residual incommensurability in some way such that this incommensurability is not evil (i.e., the single individual, who is to be expressed in the universal), then no categories are needed other than what Greek philosophy had or what can be deduced from them by consistent thought." Johannes de Silentio [Søren Kierkegaard], Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric, in Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling / Repetition, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Kierkegaard's Writings 6 (Princeton University Press, 1983), 55; "Now if this train of thought is sound, if there is nothing incommensurable in a human life, and if the incommensurable that is present is there only by an accident from which nothing results insofar as existence is viewed from the idea, then Hegel was right. But he was not right in speaking about faith or in permitting Abraham to be regarded as its father, for in the latter case he has pronounced judgment both on Abraham and on faith." Ibid., 68–69. If the latter were true, Abraham's characterization as the "father of faith" is inaccurate. The text argues for the former position, in that faith is the category that transcends ethics, and that Abraham's relationship to God cannot be logically mediated through standard ethical means. Silentio identifies three Problemata, or problems, and uses them to structure a detailed defense of his argument.
Three Problemata The second half of Fear and Trembling is made up of three Problemata, through which Johannes de silentio examines if Abraham's actions can be understood through rational ethical thinking or if they require the distinct category of faith. They are: Problema I: Is there a Teleological Suspension of the Ethical?Silentio, "Problema I: Is There a Teleological Suspension of the Ethical?," in Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric. Problema II: Is there an Absolute Duty to God?Silentio, "Problema II: Is There an Absolute Duty to God?," in Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric. Problema III: Was It Ethically Defensible for Abraham to Conceal His Undertaking from Sarah, from Eliezer, and from Isaac?Silentio, "Problema III: Was It Ethically Defensible for Abraham to Conceal His Undertaking from Sarah, from Eliezer, and from Isaac?," in Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric.
Problema I: Teleological suspension of the ethical Silentio identifies the ethical with the universal, which in his framework is incumbent upon all people at all times. Sin occurs when an individual asserts himself over and against the universal. Faith, on the other hand, is a paradox whereby an individual transcends the universal without sinning. Johannes de silentio argues that Abraham must occupy this category of faith, because without doing so, he would not be the father of the faith.
Abraham's relationship to God during the binding cannot be logically understood or mediated away according to Silentio. To illustrate, he contrasts Abraham with three other historical and mythological figures—Agamemnon, Jephthah, and Brutus—who similarly had to sacrifice or punish their offspring. Agamemnon had to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia in order for the Greek fleet to sail to Troy; Jephthah had to sacrifice his daughter after a victory to fulfill a public vow to God; and Brutus had to order the execution of his sons for conspiring against him. Fear and Trembling argues that all three are perceived as tragic heroes, because their sacrifices served an ethical purpose that their communities could understand. The decisions made can be justified and mourned within a rational framework of universal ethics.Abraham's situation is fundamentally different for Silentio. Abraham does not sacrifice Isaac for the sake of a nation, community, or public vow. His act is completely unintelligible to a rational system of ethics. The only justification that Abraham holds is in his absolute relationship to God, which does not lend itself to universal ethical discussion. The distinction lies in what the author calls the middle term: tragic heroes transgress the ethical for a higher yet still comprehensible purpose, but Abraham's transgression cannot be publicly justified. His purpose is dictated solely by his direct relationship with God, which is what places him into the category of faith rather than that of the tragic hero.
Problema II: Absolute duty to God Problema II focuses on whether an individual can have an absolute duty to God, overriding all other ethical duties. In contrast to Problema I, Problema II deals not with what kind of ethical suspension occurs, or how it comes to be, but why it must be the case for Abraham. Silentio argues that in an ethical framework an individual's relationship to God is created and maintained through fulfillment of ethical obligations. Silentio's critical move is to present a reversal of this relationship: in faith, the individual mediates his relationship to the universal through his relationship with God.
Silentio asserts that a knight of faith exists in pure isolation and cannot explain himself or his actions to others. If a knight of faith were to try to explain himself to others, this would be done in terms of the universal and would constitute "temptation" (Anfechtung)—a fallback to rational ethics that negates the movement of faith. Silentio reaffirms that faith is then an incommunicable paradox known only to the individual in question and to God.
Problema III: Abraham's concealment Problema III analyzes the question of whether Abraham's concealment of the ordeal from Sarah, Eliezer, and Isaac is ethically defensible. Silentio's answer to the question depends on what he identifies as the ethical, which he defines as not just the universal, but also the disclosed. To Silentio, it is critical that Abraham cannot be acting ethically in his concealment, since Abraham is obeying God's command directly and not explaining himself to anyone.
Problema III introduces two categories to explain Abraham's position: the aesthetic and the demonic. Silentio claims that aesthetics rewards concealment while the ethical demands disclosure. Silentio draws the contrast through the ends for which concealment is valued, where in the aesthetic it is valued for dramatic effect or personal interest. In the case of the demonic, concealment is based on sin or guilt, through which one asserts himself above the universal through sin rather than faith. Fear and Trembling uses the folk tale of Agnete and the merman to illustrate the distinction. The merman conceals his intention to seduce out of guilt, therefore placing him in the demonic. The distinction allows Silentio to argue that concealment can place one in either the divine or the demonic, depending on what motivates the silence. In Abraham's case, silence is not a product of guilt or sin but of the incommunicability of his faith.
Throughout Problema III, Silentio draws on a series of folkloric myths and figures. Such as the account Aristotle provides of a bridegroom who discovers from the Oracle at Delphi that his marriage will bring calamity; this example is used to explore if disclosure is required, ethically, when it would destroy happiness. Silentio also analyzes the story of Sarah from the Book of Tobit, whose previous seven husbands were killed by a demon on their wedding night. In the case of Sarah, her willingness to marry Tobias despite her past illustrates an absurd leap of faith. Finally, Silentio uses the figure of Faust, a doubter who remains silent so as not to throw the world into chaos, illustrating a silence grounded in guilt rather than faith, distinguishing it from Abraham's. The illustrations explain how the dynamics of concealment and disclosure in these stories interact with the categories of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious, and how these tensions are resolved through serendipity, self-sacrifice, or appeal to the absurd.