The Battle of Vyazma (3 November 1812; 22 October by OS), occurred at the beginning of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. In this encounter, a Russian force commanded by General of the Infantry Miloradovich pressed and inflicted heavy losses on the rear guard of the Grande Armée.Lieven, pp. 264–265 The was retreating back along the already devastated road, experiencing a shortage of food, a consequence of the Battle of Maloyaroslavets. Although the French thwarted Miloradovich's goal of encircling and destroying the corps of Marshal Davout, they withdrew in a partial state of disorder due to ongoing Russian harassment and heavy artillery bombardments,Lieven, p. 264Caulaincourt, p. 1974Segur, p. 167 and the town of Vyazma itself was captured in heavy fighting by Miloradovich's troops, namely the 11th Infantry Division under the command of Major General P. Choglokov (from Ostermann-Tolstoy's IV Infantry Corps) and the Cossacks of Ataman Platov. In addition to his four corps, Miloradovich also coordinated General Paskevich's 26th Division and those Cossacks around Vyazma. The French were driven out of all their defensive positions during the battle. The French reversal at Vyazma, although indecisive, was significant due to its damaging morale impact on several corps of Napoleon's retreating army, namely, the corps of Davout, Eugène, Marshal Ney, and Prince Poniatowski. From then on, Napoleon's rearguard withdrew in disarray.Caulaincourt, p. 197; Segur, p. 168
Background Napoleon's objective at this stage of the retreat was to lead the Grande Armée to the closest French supply depot, Smolensk, but the road from Moscow was long and impossible to defend. It was choked by partisan activity and Cossack raiding parties. French supply trains were routinely wiped out and 15,000 French troops were captured along this road in September and October alone. The French departed Moscow on 18 October, and after having a southern route to Smolensk denied them as a result of the Battle of Maloyaroslavets (24 October), they were compelled to backtrack and retreat along the same road used in their earlier advance on Moscow. Because the territory alongside this road had been economically ravaged by earlier French campaigning, the retreat imposed on the Grande Armée extreme conditions of privation and attrition.The deterioration of the French army's combat ability and discipline in the first two weeks of its retreat is well documented. For a discussion of this situation, see Chandler, p. 823, Riehn, pp. 335–337, Cate, pp. 343–347, Zamoyski, pp. 377–385. In the 17 days between the evacuation of Moscow and the Battle of Vyazma, half of the troops of Ney, Davout, Eugène and Poniatowski had deteriorated to the status of stragglers. Lack of foodstuffs soon led to demoralization, disorder and even starvation in the French ranks.Zamoyski, p. 385; Riehn, p. 322, describes the beginning of the breakdown in troop discipline in Moscow; on p. 341, how starvation during the retreat accelerated the deterioration in discipline.
By 3 November, the day of the action at Vyazma, the retreating Grande Armée was stretched out in a column long.Esposito and Elting, map 120 The head of the column, Junot's VIII Corps, was at Dorogobuzh, with Davout's I Corps, serving as the army's rearguard, located at the tail of the army just east of Vyazma. Between these two endpoints were, running west to east, the Imperial Guard, Joachim Murat's troops, Michel Ney's III Corps, Poniatowski's V Corps, and Eugène's IV Corps.See Riehn, pp. 338–339 for more details regarding the arrangement of this retreating train of troops
At this point, the French retreat was harassed by Cossack attacks at every juncture, Davout's corps in particular being beleaguered by Russian attacks.Riehn, pp. 338–339 By 2 November, Napoleon had grown dissatisfied with Davout's management of rearguard activities, and ordered Ney to remain in Vyazma, to allow the I, IV, and V Corps to bypass him, and to assume rearguard duties himself.Cate, p. 348
The Russians, meanwhile, organized themselves into three groups while pursuing the French. First, following Davout closely were 5,000 Cossacks commanded by Ataman Platov. This group was supported by General Ivan Paskevich's 26th Division, with 4,000 troops. Marching slightly to the south was General Miloradovich with the II and IV Infantry Corps, some 14,000 troops in all, and the II and III Cavalry Corps, which amounted to 3,500 soldiers. Miloradovich coordinated the activity of all of these troops, including those of Platov and Paskevich.This data is derived from Cate, p. 348, and Riehn, pp. 337, 345–346. He had at his disposal 19,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and 80 guns. The main Russian army led by Mikhail Kutuzov, some 70,000 troops in all, marched further to the south.See Riehn's table and notes, pp. 345–348.
On the evening of 2 November, while conducting reconnaissance south of the Smolensk-Moscow road, Miloradovich, together with his cavalry commanders General Korff and General Sievers, noticed a gap between the I Corps, situated to the east at Fedorovskoye, and the troops of the IV and V Corps located to the west just outside Vyazma. Recognizing an opportunity to isolate and destroy Davout's corps, the aggressive Miloradovich decided to attack early the next morning.Cate, pp. 348–49. Wilson, p. 242, writes that Miloradovich sent a message to Kutusov, away at Dubrova, requesting the main army's support in the upcoming action.
Action
Russian cavalry attacks At 8 am on 3 November, Miloradovich's cavalry attacked the disorganized French column holding the length of road which separated the I Corps from the IV and V Corps. Miloradovich also ordered his artillery, positioned on nearby heights, to begin a cannonade. General Robert Wilson: Narrative of events during the Invasion of Russia by Napoleon Bonaparte, and the Retreat of the French Army, 1812 p. 242 access-date=12 February 2021 With beautiful warm weather with bright sunshine the attack was a complete success, as it captured the French IV Corps baggage train and sent the French troops fleeing in disarray.Cate, p. 349 Miloradovich then placed infantrymen and horse batteries astraddle the road, thereby severing Davout's connection with the rest of the French army.
Simultaneous to Miloradovich's attack to the west of Davout, Platov's Cossacks attacked Davout from the east, supported by Paskevich's troops.Riehn, p. 339 Davout's infantrymen formed squares to meet the attack from Platov and Paskevich, and his artillerymen set up their pieces to return Miloradovich's fire. The 13,000 exhausted, hunger-weakened soldiers of Davout's Corps were now at risk of being overwhelmed and destroyed by the Russians.
Eugène's counterattack Fortunately for Davout, there was a weakness in the Russian plan of attack, in that the Russian cavalry had attacked the Vyazma-Fedorovskoye road that morning without the full support of the II and IV Infantry Corps (led by Duke Eugen of Württemberg and General Ostermann-Tolstoy respectively), which were located to the south and would not be able to reach the battlefield until 10 am, two hours after the action commenced. Miloradovich, fearing that the gap between Davout and the rest of the French army would close before he could exploit it, felt it expedient to launch his cavalry attack without having the balance of his infantry on hand. Lacking sufficient numbers of infantrymen to consolidate their hold on the Vyazma-Fedorovskoye road, Miloradovich's cavalry was vulnerable to a determined French counterattack.
At this juncture, Davout's fortunes changed for the better. His infantrymen to the east repulsed Platov and Paskevich with steady, disciplined musketfire.Wilson, Beskrovny, and Zhilin describe Platov's and Paskevich's attack as being successful, but their words are unconvincing in light of the accounts provided by Riehn, Tarle, and Cate. More importantly, Eugène heard the cannon fire engulfing Davout's position to the rear, and immediately ordered his troops to counterattack Miloradovich and regain possession of the Vyazma-Fedorovskoye road.
Eugène's counterattack fell on the rear of the troops Miloradovich had positioned on the road facing Davout. This counterattack was conducted by two of Eugène's Italian divisions, one division of Poles from the V Corps, and a single regiment of troops sent to the scene by Ney, whose III Corps was positioned in the heights near Vyazma. General Robert Wilson: Narrative of events during the Invasion of Russia by Napoleon Bonaparte, and the Retreat of the French Army, 1812 p. 243 access-date=12 February 2021 Davout, upon seeing these troops advancing to rescue him, sent his infantrymen to attack as well. Miloradovich's cavalry and his small body of infantrymen were now attacked from the east and the west, including being enveloped in French artillery shot, and were compelled to retreat from the road. Thanks to Eugène's counterattack, a passageway had been created on the Vyazma-Fedorovskoye road for Davout to continue his retreat.
Miloradovich repositions his troops The Russians at this point had been repulsed at all points, but they were hardly finished with the battle. Having pulled back from Eugène's attack, Miloradovich ordered his troops to reposition themselves parallel to the road. A heavy cannonade was then commenced against Davout's troops as they retreated toward Vyazma.Beskrovny L.G, Zhilin, and Tarle Davout's artillery was unable to respond effectively to the Russian fire, and panic broke out among his troops.
Louis Philippe, comte de Ségur, an observer of the action on the French side, describes this moment in the battle thus:
…disorder reigned in the I Corps – the one commanded by Davout. The sudden maneuver, the surprise, and particularly the tragic example of the crowd of unhorsed, unarmed cavalrymen running up and down in blind fright, threw this corps into utter confusion. This spectacle encouraged the enemy, who credited themselves with a victory. Their artillery, superior in strength, galloped into position and, opening an oblique fire on our lines, began mowing our men down, while our own guns were coming back to us at a snail's pace from Vyazma.Segur, p. 167
The damage wrought by the Russian artillery on Davout's troops was such that many of them were compelled to abandon the road, and to retreat across an open field in their desperation to reach safety behind Eugène's position. By 10 am, when the rest of Miloradovich's infantry arrived, Davout's battered corps had taken shelter behind Eugène.
Eugène's troops, too, came under pressure from the Russians and were obliged to fall back.Riehn, on p. 339, states that "…when the Russian infantry approached from the south at 10 am, Davout had already passed behind Eugène's receiving position. Eugène made a right turn and faced the Russians, but he was pressed back via Myasoyedova." Note that Wilson's description of this juncture of the battle complements Riehn's. General Sir Robert Wilson, an Englishman who observed the action from the Russian side, describes the combat at this moment as follows:
On the remainder of the Russian infantry coming up (Eugen of Württemberg and Ostermann-Tolstoy), Miloradovich renewed the attack under protection of a superior and admirably served artillery. The enemy fell back on a second position, between Rjavets and the farm of Rieaupiere, and thence, when menaced on both flanks, to some heights in front of Vyazma, where they were reinforced by the two Italian divisions, the Italian guards, and the corps of Ney. General Robert Wilson: Narrative of events during the Invasion of Russia by Napoleon Bonaparte, and the Retreat of the French Army, 1812 p. 244 access-date=12 February 2021
According to Segur, the Russian cannonshot and musketry at this point were "frighteningly effective."