The Jaffna University Helidrop was the first of the operations launched by the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) aimed at disarming the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by force and capturing the city of Jaffna, Sri Lanka, in the opening stages of Operation Pawan during the Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War. Mounted on the midnight of 12 October 1987, the operation was planned as a fast heliborne assault involving Mi-8's of the No.109 Helicopter Unit, the 10th Para Commandos and a contingent of the 13th Sikh Light Infantry. The aim of the operation was to capture the LTTE leadership at Jaffna University building which served as the Tactical Headquarters of the LTTE, which was expected to shorten Operation Pawan, the battle for Jaffna. However, the operation ended disastrously, failing to capture its objectives due to intelligence and planning failures. The heli-dropped force suffered significant casualties, with nearly the entire Sikh LI detachment of twenty-nine troops, along with six Para commandos, killed in action.
Background
An uneasy truce The signing of the Indo-Sri-Lankan accord on 29 July 1987 brought a temporary truce to the Sri Lankan Civil War. Under the terms of the agreement, Colombo agreed to a devolution of power to the provinces, Sri Lankan troops were to withdraw to their barracks in the north, and the Tamil rebels were to disarm.New Delhi & the Tamil Struggle. The Indo Sri Lanka Agreement. Satyendra N. Tamil Nation Also, on the request of President J. R. Jayewardene, India was to send a contingent, the IPKF, to Northern Sri Lanka as a peacekeeping force.
The LTTE, who had enjoyed support from India till then however, agreed to the truce only reluctantly. The Tigers had rejected the Provincial Council framework as inadequate and Prabhakaran had protested against the Indian military intervention.New Delhi & the Tamil Struggle- An Amoral Role. A Post Mortem on the Indian Intervention. Tamilnation.org The Tigers resisted the spread of what was deemed India's self-serving aim of binding Sri Lanka into India's geopolitical sphere of influence, as well as a sympathy for Sri Lanka's ruling Sinhala community in India outside the support-base in Tamil Nadu. With the induction of the Indian troops, the Tigers initially complied by surrendering arms along the terms of the truce. However, the LTTE boycotted the elections that were held in October and November 1988 along the lines outlined in the accord. The opposition to the induction of Indian troops soon flared into active confrontation. The Indian administration had not expected opposition from the Tigers and was initially taken by surprise. The support for Tamil Nationalism in India also raised the spectre to the Indian Govt. of a possible situation of Tamil secessionist movement in Tamil NaduJain Commission Interim Report.Growth of Sri Lankan Tamil Militancy in Tamil Nadu.Chapter I – Phase II (1987–1988) However, faced with growing diligence from its erstwhile partner, India adopted a strategy of aiding alternative Tamil power bases, including the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front, which had emerged strongly in the November 1988 elections, and at the same time continue negotiations with the LTTE.
Peace by any means The incident that marked the turning point of Indo-LTTE relationship occurred in early October. On 4 October 1987, the Sri Lankan Navy captured an LTTE Sea Tigers boat off Point Pedro with seventeen Tigers, including some high-profile leaders of the movement, on board. The Colombo government alleged the boat was involved in smuggling arms across the Palk Strait and on the grounds denied immunity to these captured Tiger separatists. The LTTE denied this claiming the separatist's movement were in accordance with the truce, being in the process of transferring documents for shifting the Tigers Headquarters from Madras to Jaffna. The Sri Lankan government intended to bring a number of the separatists captured, including Pulendran, Kumarappa and others, to trial in Colombo for allegedly masterminding the massacre of a hundred and fifty civilians. The Tigers, who were at the time still in negotiation with the Indian authorities, appealed for enforcement of protection by the IPKF. The rebels were at this time in IPKF custody at Palali Airbase pending transfer to Sri Lankan authorities. Although the Indian authorities insist that they had explained the possible repercussions of such an action on the fragile truce and exerted considerable pressure on the Sinhalese authorities to desist from proceeding, ultimately the IPKF withdrew allowing the Sri Lankan forces to proceed with transferring the captured rebels to Colombo. The detainees however, attempted mass suicide by swallowing cyanide- a common LTTE practice when faced imminent capture. The night of 5 October saw large scale slaughter of Sri Lankan people who had returned to Jaffna, including eight troops of the Sri Lankan Army who were at the time being held hostages by the LTTE. These coincided by armed confrontations between the Tiger cadres and the Indian troops in and around Jaffna. On 8 October, the LTTE carried out a number of mortar attacks and ambushes on the IPKF. The deterioration of the situation put the Indian government into a position of having to enforce peace in Jaffna by force. The Indian government had already been accused of inaction in the face of a failing accord. It was declared on 9 October that the IPKF was to launch a terminal campaign against the LTTE.
Prelude The Indian intelligence reports received on 10 October indicated that a Tigers' meeting was to be held at Kokkuvil in the Jaffna University campus on the night of 11 October. Intelligence further indicated the meeting was to be attended by a number of high-profile Tiger leaders, including Velupillai Prabhakaran, Gopalaswamy Mahendraraja (alias Mahattaya), as well as the LTTE local commanders. The Indian Army was aware even before this that the LTTE had been using the university as their operational headquarters. The Indian forces had already prepared for a Special Helicopter Borne Operation against Jaffna University. With these reports, General Harikat Singh- GOC 54 Infantry Division, decided to use the window offered by this meeting to capture the LTTE leadership—a move that was expected to leave the rebel movement directionless in the face of the impending assault on the LTTE strongholds by the IPKF.
The final plan tasked a hundred and twenty commandos from the 10th Para Commando group and three hundred and sixty troops from the 13th Sikh Light Infantry for the mission. The Para Commandos and the delta company of 13 Sikh LI were to be heli-dropped into the University Football ground in three waves of four helicopters. The rest of the Sikh LI contingent was to advance on the ground to link up with the heliborne troops. To minimise exposure to ground-fire, fast-roping was ruled out and the decision was made to assign the first wave of the Paras with the additional responsibility as pathfinders to mark the drop-zone. The operation was to use four Mi-8s flying from Palay airfield, two from the No. 109 Helicopter Unit, and one each from the No. 107 Helicopter Unit and the No. 112 Helicopter Unit. The Mi-8s had provisions for fitting rocket pods; this was deemed not necessary since the IPKF did not anticipate any significant resistance from the ground. A Sri Lankan Air Force Bell 212 gunship was detailed to carry out a diversionary strike west of the drop-zone across the railway tracks, which the Indian troops were under strict orders not to exceed.
On the morning of 11 October, a reconnaissance flight over the university however revealed that the football field- the designated drop-zone- may be unable to accommodate four helicopters in a single wave. Holding off outside the drop zone in the face of expected hostile fire was ruled out and a change in the plans saw the decision made to divide each wave into two flights of a pair of Mi-8s. The second flight was to leave Palay Airfield - about four minutes flying time from the drop zone- only after the first flights had started on their return leg after disembarkation of their contingent. The whole operation was expected to last for ninety minutes.
Operation Unknown to the Indian intelligence, the Tigers had intercepted Indian radio communications, had advanced knowledge of the operation, and had correctly identified the landing ground. Jaffna University had been turned into a fortress. Several 50 calibre machineguns had been moved to the north of the football field, and Tiger cadres had laid an ambush for the Indian troops.Tamil Armed Resistance & the Law Tamil Nation
First insertion - The Bravo Team, 10 Para Commando The operation H-Hour was set at midnight of the 11th. Led by Major Sheonan Singh as the Team Commander of the Para Commandos along with Major Rajiv Nair and Captain Ranbir Bhadauria, the first stick of forty Para Commandos were inserted in the first flight of two Mi-8s. The helicopter formation, led by Wg Cdr Sapre and Sqn Ldr Vinayraj as number two, approached the drop zone in low visibility observing complete black-out. The flights had only their formation lights—situated on top of the tail boom—switched on. These were turned off as the flight entered its short finals. Because of this complete blackout, the direction of approach of the first flights was missed by the Tigers. The two helicopters therefore entered the landing ground unopposed. However, as the commandos disgorged and moved to take defensive positions, they were pinned down by sustained fire from the Tiger positions. Both Sapre and Vinayraj's flight came under fire as they took off on full power, but did not suffer any hits. Under heavy fire, the Para commandos were unable to mark the drop-zone in time for the next stick. As the second flight approached the drop zone, the pilots Flt Lt V Prakash and Sqn Ldr Duraiswami could identify the flashes of small arms fire and grenades. However, added to this, the tracers from the SLAF gunship detailed for the diversionary attack were also identified as groundfire. The pilots, unable to identify the drop zone after considerable efforts, aborted the mission. The paras on the ground were by this time nearly completely encircled by the Tigers.
By the time the first flight of the second wave—flown again by Sapre and Vinayraj—took off from Palali Airbase however, the Tigers had been able to identify the approach route and moved troops and heavy machine guns to the rooftop of a building north of the field. As Sapre and Vinayraj approached their target zone, the Tigers directed heavy and sustained machinegun fire to the choppers, aiming at the cargo-hold. As the heavy machine gun fire pierced the metal skin of the helicopters, at least one commando on Vinayraj's flight was hit and wounded badly. The pilots however, were able to land and drop their load. Under increasingly intense ground fire, they took off to head back to Palali.
As the Para commandos tried to hold their ground, waiting for the rest of the detail to reinforce, however, they came under sniper fire. The LTTE had already moved in snipers armed with telescopic sights, and as the battle raged, they were able to inflict casualties on the Paras trying to hold their ground.
However, Duraiswamy and Prakash, unable to identify the LG, had not commenced on their second flight. By the time the first flight of the second wave landed back at Palali, the paras numbered eighty instead of the preplanned hundred and twenty. The decision was made for the two flights to exchange pilots, with Sapre and Vinayraj as the flight leaders of both the flights.
Delayed insertion of Delta Company, 13 Sikh Light Infantry