The , also known as the GEACPS, was a pan-Asian union that the Empire of Japan tried to establish. Initially, it covered Japan (including annexed Korea), Manchukuo, and China, but as the Pacific War progressed, it also included territories in Southeast Asia and parts of India.William L. O'Neill, A Democracy at War: America's Fight at Home and Abroad in World War II. Free Press, 1993, p. 53. The term was first coined by Minister for Foreign Affairs Hachirō Arita on June 29, 1940.
The proposed objectives of this union were to ensure economic self-sufficiency and cooperation among the member states, along with resisting the influence of Western imperialism and Soviet communism. In reality, militarists and nationalists saw it as an effective propaganda tool to enforce Japanese hegemony. The latter approach was reflected in a document released by Japan's Ministry of Health and Welfare, An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus, which promoted Japanese supremacist theories. Japanese spokesmen openly described the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as a device for the "development of the Japanese race." When World War II ended, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere became a source of criticism and scorn for the Allies.
Development of the concept
The concept of a unified Asia under Japanese leadership had its roots dating back to the 16th century. For example, Toyotomi Hideyoshi proposed to make China, Korea, and Japan into "one". Moreover, Hideyoshi had further plans to expand into India, the Philippines, and other islands in the Pacific.
Monroe Doctrine for Japan In Autumn 1872, United States minister to Japan Charles DeLong explained to U.S. General Charles LeGendre that he had been urging the Government of Japan to occupy Taiwan and "civilize" the Taiwanese indigenous people just as the U.S. had taken over the land of the Native Americans and "civilized" them.James Bradley, "The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire and War" (Little, Brown and Company, 2009), p. 186-188 General LeGendre, the first non-Japanese person hired as a foreign policy expert by the Japanese government, encouraged the Japanese to declare a Japanese "sphere of influence" modeled on the Monroe Doctrine that the U.S. had declared for the exclusion of other powers from the Western Hemisphere. Such a Japanese sphere of influence would be the first time a non-White state would adopt such a policy . The stated aim of such a sphere of influence would be to civilize the barbarian peoples of Asia. "Pacify and civilize them if possible, and if not...exterminate them or otherwise deal with them as the United States and England have dealt with the barbarians," LeGendre had explained to the Japanese.James Bradley, "The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire and War" (Little, Brown and Company, 2009), p. 188 citing Robert Eskildsen, ed. "Foreign Adventures and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874 (Nankang, Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academic Sinica, 2005), 209. Japan began invading Taiwan in 1874 and fought the Russian Empire for control of Manchuria starting in 1904.
Continuing this American policy, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt also secretly reiterated to Japan that, just as the U.S. through the Monroe Doctrine and its Roosevelt Corollary declared the Western Hemisphere as part of its sphere of influence, Japan should create its own sphere of influence in the Pacific Rim. Teddy Roosevelt was encouraged by Japan embarking on Western ways and developing a modern military in the wake of the forced "Opening of Japan" by the United States that had begun with the Perry Expedition. Roosevelt envisioned demarcating respective United States and Japanese zones of military and economic dominance in the Pacific Rim. Roosevelt told the Japanese that they are more racially similar to Americans than Russians are, even though Russians are a White race, and that Japan should take its place among the great Western powers to dominate, among other areas, Korea and Manchuria, but that Japan must not encroach on U.S. possession of the Philippines.James Bradley, "The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire and War" (Little, Brown and Company, 2009), p. 222-226 In much the same way that Europeans used the "backwardness" of African and Asian nations as a reason for why they had to conquer them, for the Japanese elite the "backwardness" of China and Korea was proof of the inferiority of those nations, thus giving the Japanese the "right" to conquer them. This mutual recognition of the U.S. and the Japanese zones of control in the Pacific would be secretly articulated in the Taft–Katsura Agreement of July 1905, essentially partitioning the Western Pacific Rim between the two powers.James Bradley, "The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire and War" (Little, Brown and Company, 2009), p. 248-251
In an interview with the New York Times days later, Katsura explained that Japan's "policy in the Far East will be in exact accord with that of England and the United States." Japan will soon force "upon Korea and China the same benefits of modern development that have been in the past forced on us.... We intend to begin a campaign of education in [Korea and China] such as we ourselves have experienced [and to develop] Asiatic commercial interests that will benefit us all. China and Korea are both atrociously mis-governed...These conditions we will endeavor to correct at the earliest possible date--by persuasion and education, if possible; by force, if necessary. And in this, as in all things, we expect to act in exact concurrence with the ideas and desires of England and the United States."James Bradley, "The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire and War" (Little, Brown and Company, 2009), p. 250-251 citing New York Times, 1905 July 30
During the proceedings of the Lansing–Ishii Agreement, Japan explained to Western observers that their expansionism in Asia was analogous to the United States' Monroe Doctrine. This conception was influential in the development of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity concept, with the Japanese Army also comparing it to the Roosevelt Corollary. One of the reasons why Japan adopted imperialism was to resolve domestic issues such as overpopulation and resource scarcity. Another reason was to withstand Western imperialism.
On November 3, 1938, Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe and Minister for Foreign Affairs Hachirō Arita proposed the development of the , which was limited to Japan, China, and the puppet state of Manchukuo.Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (2006), Asian security reassessed, pp. 48–49, 63, They believed that the union had 6 purposes:
Permanent stability of Eastern Asia Neighbourly amity and international justice Joint defence against communism Creation of a new culture Economic cohesion and co-operation World peace
The vagueness of the above points were effective in making people more agreeable to militarism and collaborationism.
On June 29, 1940, Arita renamed the union the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which he announced by radio address. At Yōsuke Matsuoka's advice, Arita emphasised on the economic aspects more. On August 1, Konoe, who still used the original name, expanded the scope of the union to include the territories of Southeast Asia. On November 5, Konoe reaffirmed that a Japan–Manchukuo–China yen blocJames L. McClain, Japan: A Modern History p. 460 would continue and be "perfected".
History
The outbreak of World War II in Europe gave the Japanese an opportunity to fulfill the objectives of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, without significant pushback from the Western powers or China.William L. O'Neill, A Democracy at War, p. 62. This entailed the conquest of Southeast Asian territories to extract their natural resources. If territories were unprofitable, the Japanese would encourage their subjects, including those in mainland Japan, to endure "economic suffering" and prevent outflow of material to the enemy. Nonetheless, they preached the moral superiority of cultivating a "spiritual essence" instead of prioritising material gain like Western powers.
After Japanese advancements into French Indochina in 1940, knowing that Japan was completely dependent on other countries for natural resources, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered a trade embargo on steel and oil, raw materials that were vital to Japan's war effort. Without steel and oil imports, Japan's military could not fight for long. As a result of the embargo, Japan decided to attack the British and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia from 7 to 19 December 1941, seizing the raw materials needed for the war effort. These efforts were successful, with Japanese politician Nobusuke Kishi announcing via radio broadcast that vast resources were available for Japanese use in the newly conquered territories.
As part of its war drive in the Pacific, Japanese propaganda included phrases like "Asia for the Asiatics" and talked about the need to "liberate" Asian colonies from the control of Western powers.Anthony Rhodes, Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II, p. 248, 1976, Chelsea House Publishers, New York They also planned to change the Chinese hegemony in the agricultural market in Southeast Asia with Japanese immigrants to boost its economic value, with the former being despised by Southeast Asian natives. The Japanese failure to bring the ongoing Second Sino-Japanese War to a swift conclusion was blamed in part on the lack of resources; Japanese propaganda claimed this was due to the refusal by Western powers to supply Japan's military.James L. McClain, Japan: A Modern History p. 471 Although invading Japanese forces sometimes received rapturous welcomes throughout recently captured Asian territories due to anti-Western and occasionally, anti-Chinese sentiment, the subsequent brutality of the Japanese military led many of the inhabitants of those regions to regard Japan as being worse than their former colonial rulers. The Japanese government directed that economies of occupied territories be managed strictly for the production of raw materials for the Japanese war effort; a cabinet member declared, "There are no restrictions. They are enemy possessions. We can take them, do anything we want".James L. McClain, Japan: A Modern History p. 495 For example, according to estimates, under Japanese occupation, about 100,000 Burmese and Malay Indian labourers died while constructing the Burma-Siam Railway. The Japanese sometimes spared ethnic groups, such as Chinese immigrants, if they supported the war effort, whether sincerely or not.
An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus – a secret document completed in 1943 for high-ranking government use – laid out that Japan, as the originator and strongest military power within the region, would naturally take the superior position within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, with the other nations under Japan's umbrella of protection. Japanese propaganda was useful in mobilizing Japanese citizens for the war effort, convincing them Japan's expansion was an act of anti-colonial liberation from Western domination.Chickering, R., & Forster, S. (Eds.). (2003). The shadows of total war: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919–1939. Cambridge University Press, p. 330 The booklet Read This and the War is Won—for the Japanese Army—presented colonialism as an oppressive group of colonists living in luxury by burdening Asians. According to Japan, since racial ties of blood connected other Asians to the Japanese, and Asians had been weakened by colonialism, it was Japan's self-appointed role to "make men of them again" and liberate them from their Western oppressors.John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War pp. 24–25