Animal rights is the philosophy according to which many or all sentient animals have moral worth independent of their utility to humans, and their most basic interests—such as avoiding suffering—should be afforded the same consideration as similar interests of human beings.DeGrazia (2002), ch. 2; Taylor (2009), ch. 1. The argument from marginal cases is often used to reach this conclusion. This argument holds that if human beings such as infants, senile people, and the cognitively disabled are granted moral status and negative rights, then nonhuman animals must be granted the same moral consideration, since animals do not lack any known morally relevant characteristic that marginal-case humans have.

Broadly speaking, and particularly in popular discourse, the term "animal rights" is often used synonymously with "animal protection" or "animal liberation". More narrowly, "animal rights" refers to the idea that many animals have fundamental rights to be treated with respect as individuals—rights to life, liberty, and freedom from torture—that may not be overridden by considerations of aggregate welfare.Taylor (2009), ch. 3. Like human rights, animal rights center on the notion of freedom.

Many animal rights advocates oppose assigning moral value and fundamental protections on the basis of species membership alone.Compare for example similar usage of the term in 1938: They consider this idea, known as speciesism, a prejudice as irrational as any other,Horta (2010). and hold that animals should not be considered property or used as food, clothing, entertainment, or beasts of burden merely because they are not human.That a central goal of animal rights is to eliminate the property status of animals, see Sunstein (2004), p. 11ff. For speciesism and fundamental protections, see Waldau (2011). For food, clothing, research subjects or entertainment, see Francione (1995), p. 17. Cultural traditions such as Jainism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Shinto, and animism also espouse varying forms of animal rights.

In parallel to the debate about moral rights, North American law schools now often teach animal law, and several legal scholars, such as Steven M. Wise and Gary L. Francione, support extending basic legal rights and personhood to nonhuman animals. The animals most often considered in arguments for personhood are apes, especially great apes. Some animal-rights academics support this because it would break the species barrier, but others oppose it because it predicates moral value on mental complexity rather than sentience alone.For animal-law courses in North America, see "Animal law courses" , Animal Legal Defense Fund. Retrieved July 12, 2012. For a discussion of animals and personhood, see Wise (2000), pp. 4, 59, 248ff; Wise (2004); Posner (2004); Wise (2007) . For the arguments and counter-arguments about awarding personhood only to great apes, see Garner (2005), p. 22. Also see Sunstein, Cass R. (February 20, 2000). "The Chimps' Day in Court" , The New York Times. , 29 countries had enacted bans on hominoid experimentation; Argentina granted captive orangutans basic human rights in 2014. Outside of primates, animal-rights discussions most often address the status of mammals (compare charismatic megafauna). Other animals (considered less sentient) have gained less attention—insects relatively little (outside Jainism) and animal-like bacteria hardly any.The concept of "bacteria rights" can appear coupled with disdain or irony: The vast majority of animals have no legally recognised rights.

Critics of animal rights argue that nonhuman animals are unable to enter into a social contract, and thus cannot have rights, a view summarised by the philosopher Roger Scruton, who writes that only humans have duties, and therefore only humans have rights. Another argument, associated with the utilitarian tradition, maintains that animals may be used as resources so long as there is no unnecessary suffering; animals may have some moral standing, but any interests they have may be overridden in cases of comparatively greater gains to aggregate welfare made possible by their use, though what counts as "necessary" suffering or a legitimate sacrifice of interests can vary considerably.Garner (2005), pp. 11, 16. Also see Frey (1980); and for a review of Frey, see Sprigge (1981) . Certain forms of animal-rights activism, such as the destruction of fur farms and of animal laboratories by the Animal Liberation Front, have attracted criticism, including from within the animal-rights movement itself,Singer (2000), pp. 151–156. and prompted the U.S. Congress to enact laws, including the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, allowing the prosecution of this sort of activity as terrorism.

History and background

Hemachandra, a 12th-century Jain scholar and monk, achieved a significant political victory for vegetarianism in Indian history. He converted King Kumarapala of the Chaulukya dynasty (who ruled present-day Gujarat and surrounding areas) to Jainism. Under Hemachandra's guidance, Kumarapala issued sweeping imperial edicts (amari-ghoshana) that banned the slaughter of animals. This alliance is historically responsible for cementing Gujarat as the geographic epicenter of strict vegetarian cuisine in India.

In the 16th century, the Jain monk Hiravijaya Suri was invited to the court of the Mughal Emperor Akbar. Through philosophical discussions about nonviolence, the monk persuaded Akbar to issue imperial edicts (farmans) that enforced animal welfare across the empire. These edicts banned the slaughter of animals for several months of the year, prohibited fishing in specific sacred lakes, and mandated the release of thousands of caged birds. This represents one of the earliest recorded instances of state-enforced animal welfare and dietary restrictions at the imperial level in Indian history.

Jain communities established large-scale systems for animal welfare long ago. Jain merchants funded the creation of panjrapoles—specialized animal shelters and hospitals designed to care for sick, old, or rescued livestock and birds. The motivation for these shelters was not ethical philosophy, but the core Jain religious belief that committing violence against any living creature directly harms a person's soul and spiritual purity.

Serious discussion about animal rights began in 18th- and 19th-century Europe, but respect for animals can be found in most cultures and traditions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and some African and Indigenous cultures. In the Western world, Aristotle viewed animals as lacking reason"Animal Rights." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2007. and existing for human use, though other ancient philosophers believed animals deserved gentle treatment. Major religious traditions, chiefly Indian or Dharmic religions, opposed animal cruelty. While scholars like Descartes saw animals as unconscious automata,Waddicor, M. H., Montesquieu and the Philosophy of Natural Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1970), p. 63 .Parker, J. V., Animal Minds, Animal Souls, Animal Rights (Lanham: University Press of America, 2010), p. 16 , 88 , 99 . and Kant denied direct duties to animals,Kant, Immanuel (1785). Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals Jeremy Bentham emphasized their capacity to suffer.Bentham, Jeremy. 1780. "Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence". pp. 307–335 in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. London: T. Payne and Sons. The publications of Charles Darwin eventually eroded the Cartesian view of animals.Spencer, J., Love and Hatred are Common to the Whole Sensitive Creation': Animal Feeling in the Century before Darwin," in A. Richardson, ed., After Darwin: Animals, Emotions, and the Mind (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2013), p. 37 . Darwin noted the mental and emotional continuity between humans and animals, suggesting the possibility of animal suffering. The anti-vivisection movement emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, driven significantly by women. From the 1970s onward, growing scholarly and activist interest in animal treatment has aimed to raise awareness and reform laws to improve animal rights and human–animal relationships.Garner, Robert (2004). Animals, Politics, and Morality: Second Edition. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, p. 3.

In The Sage Handbook of Promotional Culture and Society, Edwards et al. write, "unsurprisingly, no consensus is required to acknowledge that if a being can suffer, then it is wrong to make her suffer, regardless of the species." In the words of Jeremy Bentham, what matters is not a being's cognitive abilities or capacities, but whether they can feel and therefore experience suffering. The scientific consensus that nonhuman animals are not only sentient but also conscious, and therefore able to feel and generate states of mind accordingly, is affirmed by the 2012 Cambridge Declaration of Consciousness, which says "non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviours." This further involves not only agency (the capacity to make choices and subjectivity, i.e., personhood or individual, differentiated traits) but also having a concept of death. These can be illustrated by the behavior of exploited animals (as in farming, labor, scientific laboratories), particularly their resistance to manipulation and confinement, including attempts to escape when opportunities arise.

In religion

For some the basis of animal rights is in religion or animal worship (or in general nature worship), with some religions banning killing any animal. In other religions animals are considered unclean. Hindu and Buddhist societies abandoned animal sacrifice and embraced vegetarianism from the 3rd century BCE.Garner (2005), pp. 21–22. One of the most important sanctions of the Jain, Hindu, and Buddhist faiths is the concept of ahimsa, or refraining from the destruction of life. According to Buddhism, humans do not deserve preferential treatment over other living beings. The Dharmic interpretation of this doctrine prohibits the killing of any living being. These Indian religions' dharmic beliefs are reflected in the ancient Indian works of the Tolkāppiyam and Tirukkural, which contain passages that extend the idea of nonviolence to all living beings.

The historical codification of Jain vegetarianism as a universal mandate for the lay community is sociologically anchored in the narrative of Neminatha, the 22nd tirthankara. According to Jain tradition, Prince Neminatha abandoned his royal wedding in Junagadh upon hearing the cries of captive animals slated to be slaughtered for the wedding feast. His renunciation is said to be followed by his meditation at Mount Girnar. His refusal to predicate personal celebration upon animal slaughter served as a defining cultural catalyst. Scholars identify this event as the foundational charter myth that shifted vegetarianism from an isolated ascetic exercise in self-denial into a universal ethical baseline regarding animal welfare for the entire Jain community.

In Islam, animal rights were recognized early by the Sharia. This recognition is based on both the Qur'an and the Hadith. The Qur'an contains many references to animals, detailing that they have souls, form communities, communicate with God, and worship Him in their own way. Muhammad forbade his followers to harm any animal and asked them to respect animals' rights. Nevertheless, Islam does allow eating of certain species of animals.