The United Nations has played an advisory role in maintaining peace and order in the Kashmir region soon after the independence and partition of British India into the dominions of Pakistan and India in 1947, when a dispute erupted between the two new States on the question of accession over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. India took this matter to the UN Security Council, which passed resolution 39 (1948) and established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate the issues and mediate between the two new countries. Following the cease-fire of hostilities, it also established the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to monitor the cease-fire line.

Overview

1948–1951 Following the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947, India's Governor General Mountbatten flew to Lahore on 1 November 1947 for a conference with Muhammad Ali Jinnah, proposing that, in all the princely States where the ruler did not accede to a Dominion corresponding to the majority population (which would have included Junagadh, Hyderabad as well Kashmir), the accession should be decided by an 'impartial reference to the will of the people'. Jinnah rejected the offer. The Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan met again in December, where Nehru informed Khan of India's intention to refer the dispute to the United Nations under article 35 (Chapter VI) of the UN Charter, which allows the member states to bring to the Security Council attention situations `likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace'.

India sought resolution of the issue at the UN Security Council (UNSC) on 1 January 1948. Following the set-up of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), the UN Security Council passed Resolution 47 on 21April 1948. The measure imposed an immediate cease-fire and called on the Government of Pakistan 'to secure the withdrawal from the state of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the state for the purpose of fighting.' It also asked Government of India to reduce its forces to minimum strength, after which the circumstances for holding a plebiscite should be put into effect 'on the question of Accession of the state to India or Pakistan.' However, it was not until 1 January 1949 that the ceasefire could be put into effect, signed by General Gracey on behalf of Pakistan and General Roy Bucher on behalf of India.

The UNCIP made three visits to the subcontinent between 1948 and 1949, trying to find a solution agreeable to both India and Pakistan. It reported to the Security Council in August 1948 that "the presence of troops of Pakistan" inside Kashmir represented a "material change" in the situation. A two-part process was proposed for the withdrawal of forces. In the first part, Pakistan was to withdraw its forces as well as other Pakistani nationals from the state. In the second part, "when the Commission shall have notified the Government of India" that Pakistani withdrawal has been completed, India was to withdraw the bulk of its forces. After both the withdrawals were completed, a plebiscite would be held. The resolution was accepted by India but effectively rejected by Pakistan.

The Indian government considered itself to be under legal possession of Jammu and Kashmir by virtue of the accession of the state. The assistance given by Pakistan to the rebel forces and the Pakhtoon tribes was held to be a hostile act and the further involvement of the Pakistan army was taken to be an invasion of Indian territory. From the Indian perspective, the plebiscite was meant to confirm the accession, which was in all respects already complete, and Pakistan could not aspire to an equal footing with India in the contest.

The Pakistan government held that the state of Jammu and Kashmir had executed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan which precluded it from entering into agreements with other countries. It also held that the Maharaja had no authority left to execute accession because his people had revolted and he had to flee the capital. It believed that the Azad Kashmir movement as well as the tribal incursions were indigenous and spontaneous, and Pakistan's assistance to them was not open to criticism.

In short, India required an asymmetric treatment of the two countries in the withdrawal arrangements regarding Pakistan as an 'aggressor', whereas Pakistan insisted on parity. The UN mediators tended towards parity, which was not to India's satisfaction. In the end, no withdrawal was ever carried out, India insisting that Pakistan had to withdraw first, and Pakistan contending that there was no guarantee that India would withdraw afterwards. No agreement could be reached between the two countries on the process of demilitarisation.

Scholars have commented that the failure of the Security Council efforts of mediation owed to the fact that the council regarded the issue as a purely political dispute without investigating its legal underpinnings. PeriodAdopted resolutionsNotes1948–1951 (First Kashmir War)UNSC Resolution 38India approaches the UN. UN requests the two parties to calm down.UNSC Resolutions 39, 47, 51UNSC establishes the UNCIP and issues instructions to it.UNCIP Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949UNCIP unanimously adopts a resolution amending and amplifying the UN Resolution 47. It deals with a ceasefire, truce agreement and further consultation with the commission. This eventually leads to the Karachi agreement.UNSC Resolutions 80, 91, 96, 98UNCIP fails in its overall task. UNCIP terminated. UNMOGIP constituted. Ceasefire acknowledged. Demilitarization attempts furthered.

1951–1957 The India-Pakistan question was not a part of the agenda for the UNSC from 1953 and 1957. During this period, both India and Pakistan made internal decisions that worsened each other's perception of the other's stance on Kashmir. Pakistan became a part of the military alliances Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). India saw nationalist movements from 1954 onwards. Organizations such as Bhartiya Jana Sangha demanded integration. The main trigger for Pakistan to appeal to the UNSC was the adoption of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir in November 1956 which stated "The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and will be a part of Union of India". PeriodAdopted resolutionsNotes1957UNSC Resolutions 122UNSC reminds both parties of previous resolutions.Soviet Union vetoRejection of a joint draft resolution through Soviet veto on 20 February 1957UNSC Resolutions 123, 126"Resolution requesting the President of the Security Council to examine with India and Pakistan any proposals likely to contribute to the settlement of the dispute. Requesting the United Nations Representative of India and Pakistan to make any recommendations to the parties for further appropriate action with a view to making progress toward the implementation of the resolutions of the UNCIP and toward a peaceful settlement."

1962–1972 Through a letter on 1 January 1962 Pakistan asked for a meeting of the UNSC. Shortly after, India said that such a meeting was not required. This continued until the UNSC eventually held discussions on the India-Pakistan question on 1 February 1962 and between 27 April and 22 June 1962. Following the Second Kashmir War, India and Pakistan signed the Tashkent Declaration. The Tashkent Declaration by-passed the United Nations and was brokered by the Soviet Union. The liberation of Bangladesh and 1972 Simla Agreement made India harden its stance on aversion to United Nations mediation on Kashmir. PeriodAdopted resolutionsNotes1962Draft resolution dated 22 June 1962 not adoptedThe draft resolution failed adoption with 7 votes in favour and 2 against, with 2 abstentions. One of the negative votes was of the Soviet Union.1965 (Second Kashmir War)UNSC Resolutions 209, 210, 211, 214, 215UN concerned about situation along ceasefire line. Demands ceasefire and that representatives of India and Pakistan meet with a representative of the secretary-general. Following a speech by the Pakistani Foreign Minister, India conducts a walkout from the UN. United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) successful.1971 (Indo-Pakistani War of 1971)UNSC Resolutions 303, 307With respect to Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, UN calls for cessation of hostilities.

1972–present 1972 onwards, UNSC no longer passed any resolution on the India-Pakistan question. Pakistan independently and through bodies such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, continues to raise the issue at the United Nations General Assembly. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and UN Secretary General over the years have commented upon the issue. The OHCHR came out with two reports in 2018 and 2019.

The UNMOGIP is still functional. According to the secretary-general the UNMOGIP can only be abolished through a UNSC decision. However, India has maintained that the Simla agreement of July 1972, which stipulated that both countries would settle differences peacefully through bilateral negotiations rendered previous Council resolutions redundant.

Following the revocation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, the UNSC discussed the Kashmir question at least three times. However no resolutions was taken and no statement issued.

Mediatory reports Mediatory reports include: UNCIP: 4 Andrew McNaughton, Owen Dixon, Gunnar Jarring: 1 each Frank Graham: 6

McNaughton proposals

In December 1949 the Canadian president of the UNSC, General McNaughton, was requested by the council to approach the two states to solve the dispute. McNaughton issued both states on 22 December with his proposals and two days before his term as president of the council was to expire he reported back to the UNSC, on 29 December. But the council asked him to continue his mediation and he did so, submitting his final report on 3 February 1950.

His proposal enclosed a scheme whereby Pakistan and India would simultaneously withdraw their regular forces (excluding those Indian regular forces needed for security purposes). The Azad Kashmir Regular Force & Jammu and Kashmir State forces (and other militia) would both be demobilized. The Northern Areas would also be demilitarised and its administration would remain with the local authorities, under UN supervision. Pakistan accepted his suggestions but India proposed two far-reaching amendments which amounted to a rejection.

The proposals treated India and Pakistan as equal participants in the dispute which was not acceptable to India. In India's view, Pakistan was present illegally in Kashmir while India was present legally. The United States warned India that it would have no option but to comply with any decision that the Security Council may opt for because by rejecting the McNaugton proposals it would be the third successive time India spurned the conclusions of a neutral UN representative, upon which Nehru accused the US of pressurizing his government. India's rejections of the McNaugton proposals were viewed by American policymakers as an example of Indian "intransigence."

The McNaughton proposals, widely supported in the Security Council, led to the passage of a resolution on 14 March 1950 that recognized Pakistan as an equal party in the Kashmir dispute and allotted both India and Pakistan a five-month period to implement a demilitarisation plan; while Pakistan accepted the resolution, India unequivocally rejected it. The council then appointed Sir Owen Dixon as the next UN representative to the two countries; and he was tasked with administering McNaughton's demilitarisation scheme, which India had already rejected.

Dixon mission