Operation Frantic was a series of seven shuttle bombing operations during World War II conducted by American aircraft based in Great Britain and southern Italy, which landed at three Soviet airfields in the Ukrainian SSR. From there, the planes flew bombing missions en route back to their bases in Italy and Great Britain.
Frantic was meant to open up new German-held areas of Europe to strategic bombing by the United States Army Air Forces, but saw mixed results, with German leadership perceiving the operation as an American propaganda campaign to impress the Soviets. Frantic also highlighted significant tensions between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, which proved both unfamiliar with and unfriendly to hosting foreign aircraft for joint operations. After its seventh bombing mission, in mid-September 1944, Frantic was discontinued.
Overview
American plans to use air bases in the USSR began as United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) staff studies soon after the German invasion on 22 June 1941. After the Japanese attack on the United States on 7 December, the concept was expanded to hit the Japanese Home Islands from Siberia. However, Soviet air cooperation was negligible through 1942, and it was not until the Foreign Ministers' conference (Moscow Conference) in Moscow in October 1943 that the American delegation raised the issue formally with Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov.
At the Tehran Conference in late November 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt personally proposed the use of Soviet bases by American aircraft to Marshal Joseph Stalin. In this he was assisted by a personal appeal from his son, Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, also in attendance, who requested the bases for use of his reconnaissance aircraft then operating from Italy.
The position papers given to Stalin emphasized both reconnaissance and bombardment operations, and Stalin agreed to proceed with the plan "in principle." American heavy bombers stationed in Britain and Italy would fly strike missions deep into the heart of Nazi territory or occupied Eastern Europe. Afterwards, they would land at American air bases in newly recovered Soviet territory, re-arm and re-fuel, and then attack other targets on their return flights.
Operation Frantic, originally known as Operation Baseball, was intended to permanently establish three heavy bomber groups in Soviet territory, but only a small contingent, about 1,300 men, was eventually detached to the American bases in the USSR.
During the four months of major operations, 24 targets in German-held territory—some never before within effective range of the American strategic bomber forces—were attacked.
While the shuttle bombing technique complicated German air defenses, in practice most targets were already coming in reach of US bomber streams from Italy and England. Soviet vetoing of some targets prevented more effective use of the bases.Staff. Shuttle bombing McGraw-Hill's Access Science Encyclopedia of Science & Technology Online
The operations were reduced and finally discontinued due to a number of issues; a catastrophic German air attack on the bases in June; Soviet hostility and non-cooperation that started in August; and the inability of the Americans to receive permission to use the bases for support of the Warsaw Uprising or for repatriation of American POWs from Soviet territory, which soured relations between the two countries.
The main operational difficulty encountered by the US forces was inadequate force protection by the Soviets. The Soviets refused US requests to introduce adequate radar-guided artillery and night fighter support, and US aircraft were frequently fired upon by Soviet forces.
The three bases reached their peak in July and August 1944, with a firmly limited complement of 1,300 US officers and men. By October, operations were put on a "skeleton crew" basis, with a winter contingent at Poltava only of about 300. Americans remained there until evacuation after VE Day.
Operation Frantic has greater historical importance for the development of Soviet-American relations than for its effect on Germany's war effort. Although it started out with high hopes, it eventually set a discordant note that foreshadowed the Cold War.
Objectives
The ability to hit distant German targets was not the only, or even the primary, American objective for Operation Frantic. The political and military leadership wanted also to set a precedent and practical basis for later bombing of Japan from Siberia after the USSR opened the second front in the Pacific. Additionally, they wanted to provide a model for developing trust and cooperation between the two powers, which was deemed essential to establishing amicable post-war relations; and to develop close cooperation and exchanges in technology and research, specifically telecommunications, meteorology, air reconnaissance, and air transport networks.
After approval was given by Moscow in February 1944, a rapid buildup followed. Staff exchanges were made; the first "echelons" of American personnel began to arrive; and a US delegation flew to Moscow in an operational B-17, which was used to demonstrate American bombing tactics to the Soviets. A USAAF Eastern Command (General Alfred Kessler) was established at Poltava, operating in parallel with the new American Military Mission to Moscow (General John R. Deane).
When a high-level US delegation led by United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) deputy chief of staff for operations, General Frederick Anderson (accompanied by Colonel Roosevelt), visited Moscow and the bases in May 1944, conditions were such that the go-ahead for actual operations could be given. At the same time, Anderson let his side know that the ultimate goal was the establishment of a numbered American air force in the USSR and a switch to Siberian operations. For diplomatic reasons, this could not be revealed to the Soviets. As it was, the Americans had to make do with a much smaller presence in the Soviet Union than originally contemplated.
Frantic also tied in with other US initiatives. At Tehran, General Henry Arnold (chief of the Air Forces) offered Stalin 300–400 B-24 bombers, but noted that they would require a large Soviet training program in the United States. Stalin did not take this offer; instead, American B-29 bombers after bombing Japan and diverting to Siberia for safety landing were kept and copied by Soviet factories.
Britain's Royal Air Force did not participate in Operation Frantic. However, 21 RAF Avro Lancaster bombers did fly from a Soviet airfield in September 1944 in a separate operation—Operation Paravane—to attack the battleship Tirpitz.
Uncertainty surrounds Soviet objectives in agreeing to the operation. Unlike the Americans, the USSR had no doctrine of victory through aerial bombardment, and had only a rudimentary long-range air force. Furthermore, when the survival of the USSR was in doubt, Marshal Stalin refused offers of air support, demanding instead maximum lend-lease deliveries. By the time Stalin finally agreed to activate the plan, in a meeting with US ambassador W. Averell Harriman on 2 February 1944, Soviet victory was assured. Indications are that Stalin wished to obtain all possible information about superior American technology, and assigned officers with the stated objectives of learning as much as they could about US equipment and concepts of operation. For example, the USSR demanded and obtained the secret Norden bombsight, and also obtained wide photographic coverage of Europe from American aircraft. However, this objective cut both ways, for the USAAF also learned of the extreme vulnerability of the USSR to air attack, and of the primitive technical and infrastructure conditions prevailing on the Soviet side.
Airfields
After meeting with Stalin on 2 February 1944, Harriman radioed back that "Stalin approves project limited to 200 bombers and six airfields." In the end only three bases were set up. In haste, the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe established a headquarters detachment at Poltava Airfield, in Poltava region in the Ukrainian SSR in late April, 1944. Poltava was designated as USAAF Station 559 for security purposes and was thus referred to in all messages and written correspondence. Poltava was one of three Soviet installations operated by Headquarters, Eastern Command USAAF. The others were Pyriatyn Airfield (AAF-560) and Myrhorod Airfield (AAF-561). All three bases were situated along the Kharkov-Kiev railway and were already far behind the front. Poltava and Mirgorod were to be used by heavy bombers (B-24 Liberators, B-17 Flying Fortresses), while Piriatyn would be used for long-range escort fighters (P-51 Mustangs, P-38 Lightnings).Anderson, Barry, (1985), United States Air Forces Stations, Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
The bases were farther away than the USAAF wanted, and despite the best efforts were barely adequate for heavy bombers. Soviet infrastructure was not up to Western standards; the spring season turned everything into a sea of mud; and the retreating Germans had destroyed whatever they could. At Poltava, the Germans left behind a large headquarters building, but it was booby-trapped with a radio-controlled bomb that was, however, discovered in time. Also, the American officers found themselves dealing with an unfriendly and suspicious Soviet bureaucracy. In general, US officers agreed that the Red Air Force was cooperative and eager to assist, but the political structure was obstructionist and a source of interminable delays and problems. After August–September, the Soviet attitude became universally hostile, and by 1945 the small American detachments left in great bitterness. Winston Churchill had not been very enthusiastic about Frantic, believing that it was placing a lot more trust on Stalin than was wise, and events seemed to bear him out.
Heavy equipment and bulky supplies went by sea to the ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk in the Arctic, and then by train to the airfields in the Ukrainian SSR. Additional supplies and key personnel flew in on Air Transport Command planes from the ATC base at Mehrabad Airport, Iran. As there was no trans-Caucasian railway, additional shipping went across the Caspian to Baku. The logistical demands were enormous since almost everything had to be brought from the United States, even the high-octane aviation fuel and the steel-plank runways. Delicate negotiations finally fixed a total of 42 round-trip ATC missions to make the bases operational for the AAF, and allowed an additional rate of two weekly support missions to sustain the US contingent. The issue of flight communications eventually ended with a compromise, allowing US crews to carry out navigation and radio duties with a Soviet observer resident at all related communications centers. In support of Operation Frantic, ATC delivered some 450 personnel and thirty-six thousand pounds of cargo by June 1944.Bilstein, Roger E. (1998), Airlift and Airborne Operations in World War II, Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
Known units
Eighth Air Force 45th Combat Wing (at Poltava Airfield, ca 75 bombers) 96th Bombardment Group, RAF Snetterton Heath, B-17 Flying Fortress 388th Bombardment Group, RAF Knettishall, B-17 Flying Fortress 452d Bombardment Group, RAF Deopham Green, B-17 Flying Fortress
13th Combat Wing (at Myrhorod Airfield, ca 75 bombers)13th Combat Wing 95th Bombardment Group, RAF Horham, B-17 Flying Fortress 100th Bombardment Group, RAF Thorpe Abbotts, B-17 Flying Fortress 390th Bombardment Group, RAF Framlingham, B-17 Flying Fortress
Escort Fighter (at Pyriatyn Airfield) 4th Fighter Group, RAF Debden, P-51 Mustang 352nd Fighter Group, RAF Bodney, P-51 Mustang 355th Fighter Group, RAF Steeple Morden, P-51 Mustang 357th Fighter Group, RAF Leiston, P-51 Mustang