The Stalingrad-class battlecruiser, also known as Project 82 (), was a battlecruiser design of the Soviet Union in 1941. It was a smaller and less-expensive counterpart to the s of 1939. The original role was for a light, fast ship intended to break up attacks by British fast-cruiser forces that might attempt bombardment of Russia's northern ports. In keeping with the battlecruiser design concept, they would have been able to outgun any ship with similar speed, or outrun anything more heavily armed. Design work had just started when the German invasion of the Soviet Union opened and the design was put on hold.
The design was reimagined in 1944, intended to operate along with the s and proposed aircraft carriers to make up powerful task forces able to challenge the American fleet. In this role it would need to be a more powerful ship than the original design, taking over for the now-cancelled Kronstadts. They were intended to fend off enemy attacks and protect the carriers when bad weather prevented flying. A series of four were ordered, and Stalingrad finally began construction in 1951.
Supported primarily by Joseph Stalin and opposed by a considerable part of the naval staff, the project came to an abrupt end with Stalin's death in 1953. By this time the second and third ships were under construction and abandoned on the slipway, while a fourth was never started. The partially completed Stalingrad ended as a target ship for testing anti-ship missiles, before being broken up around 1962.
Background and genesis The roots of the Project 82-class began back in May 1941 when the Main Naval Staff approved tactical requirements (, OTZ) for a medium-sized cruiser between the light cruisers of the and classes, and the Kronshtadts. It was intended to fulfill the following roles: Engage enemy cruisers armed with guns Destroy enemy light cruisers Support its own light cruisers Lay minefields Suppress the enemy's medium-caliber coast defense batteries and support landing operations Conduct operations against the enemy's maritime lines of communicationMcLaughlin, p. 103
To accomplish these missions, the Navy desired a ship of or smaller, armed with eight 203 mm and twelve guns, a dozen anti-aircraft (AA) guns and one triple torpedo mount. It was to be armored to withstand 203 mm shells with a speed not less than , a range of at and able to carry four seaplanes launched by two catapults. Three preliminary designs were proposed in response, but only one, which displaced , was able to meet all of the requirements. However, the designers recommended an increase in the main armament caliber to , a strengthened anti-aircraft battery and reductions in the armor protection, speed, and range. The opening of Operation Barbarossa a month later rendered these plans moot as both the Project 82 and the Kronshtadt (Project 69) classes were put on hold.
The project was revived in 1943 with a new requirement issued on 15 September. This was basically identical to the original, but added one new requirement: "Protect the operations of aircraft carriers and conduct joint operations with them." Estimated characteristics were a displacement between , nine main guns between , a secondary battery of a dozen dual-purpose guns and thirty-two 37 mm AA guns. The speed, range and aircraft requirements remained the same, although the torpedo tubes were dropped. Over a dozen preliminary designs had been proposed by May 1944, but none were acceptable.McLaughlin, pp. 103–104
A new tactical requirement was issued in November 1944 that envisioned a more realistic displacement of while the speed was dropped to and the range to . Armament was also revised to nine 220 mm guns, sixteen 130 mm guns, thirty-two and twenty AA guns. These last weapons were changed to in 1945.
Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov believed that these ships could protect the planned Soviet aircraft carriers in bad weather from American cruisers and pushed to have them built, but the Shipbuilding Commissariat balked. It refused to begin detailed design work pleading the uncertainty of the post-war building situation and the already heavy workload of its design bureau. Undeterred, the Navy continued studying cruiser designs and planned a ten-year construction program for the period 1946–1955. This was based on defensive operations along the periphery of the Soviet Union against Anglo-American carrier groups while submarines would attack their lines of communication. Ten of these large cruisers were envisioned as part of this construction program. When the program was discussed by the Politburo on 29 September 1945 there was no great disagreement on the large cruisers, although Stalin favored increasing the size of their main guns to , but did not push the issue when Admiral Kuznetsov resisted.McLaughlin, p. 104
A bigger problem was the resistance of the Shipbuilding Commissariat which said it would be impossible to lay down any ships of new design until about 1950 and that only incremental changes could be made to the designs currently in production. The Navy saw no reason why new ships, reflecting wartime experience, could not be laid down beginning in 1948. To resolve the dispute a special commission was appointed, led by Lavrentiy Beria, which mostly sided with the Shipbuilding Commissariat in that most ships of the program would be improved versions of current designs. Four of the large cruisers were to begin construction, two each at Shipyard 402 in Molotovsk and Shipyard 444 at Nikolayev with another three planned to be laid down in 1953 and 1955. This compromise was approved on 27 November 1945 and detailed design work began in 1946 for designs equipped with both the 220 mm and 305 mm guns.
This was reaffirmed by a decree of the Council of Ministers on 28 January 1947. By August 1947, the Navy and the Shipbuilding Ministry had winnowed down design proposals to only three, one from each armed with 305 mm guns and a joint design armed with 220 mm guns. The latter's design was slightly smaller (by ) than the Navy's design, and had an armor belt thinner, but was otherwise almost identical. The joint design was smaller with a reduced secondary armament, but was about faster. All proposals had a range of at . These designs weren't reviewed until March 1948, probably because of the need to coordinate reaction to the American Marshall Plan, and Stalin approved the Navy's more heavily protected design. But even this was subject to more delays as the detailed specifications had to be approved and this didn't occur until 31 August 1948, likely delayed by the Tito–Stalin split and the start of the Berlin Blockade, both in June.McLaughlin, pp. 105–106, 108
With the approval of the specifications, TsKB-17, the heavy-ship design bureau, began work on the sketch design to be submitted for approval to the Council of Ministers before the start of the technical design could begin. By March 1949, four alternatives had been completed, differing mainly in the arrangement of the 130 mm guns and the boiler layout. The bureau preferred one layout and the Navy and the Shipbuilding Ministry concurred so the bureau began the technical design, without formal approval, in order to be ready to lay down the first two ships in the third quarter of 1950 as already scheduled. However, when Stalin reviewed the sketch design in September 1949, he rejected it, ordering a smaller, faster ship capable of . TsKB-17 was able to produce a preliminary technical design that met Stalin's demands by the end of the year, an amazingly fast amount of time for what should have been a very involved process. The most likely explanation is that the designers retained as much of their original work as possible and found room for the more powerful turbines and more numerous boilers necessary to attain Stalin's specified speed by deleting the two rear twin 130 mm turrets, and their magazines, as revealed by a comparison of the 1949 and 1951 sketches.McLaughlin, pp. 108–109
The Navy didn't like the compromises made to reduce the displacement down to Stalin's and to achieve the high speed demanded as revealed in a March 1950 meeting in the Kremlin where Stalin revealed critical points about his thoughts for these ships. When the admirals responded to his question about the purpose of these ships by saying that they were to fight the enemy's heavy cruisers, he contradicted them and said that their purpose was to fight light cruisers: "It is necessary to increase its speed to 35 knots and create a cruiser that will cause panic among the enemy's light cruisers, disperse and destroy them."McLaughlin, p. 109 Furthermore, he believed that they would fight close to home, defending the coastal waters of Soviet Union. "You cannot blindly copy the Americans and English, they face different conditions, their ships travel far over the ocean, out of touch with their bases. We are not considering conducting oceanic battles, but instead will fight close to our own shores, so we do not need a large ammunition supply on the ship." The admirals also did not like the reduction in the secondary armament made to accommodate the larger machinery and extra boilers needed to reach the speed desired by Stalin, but he reminded them that most aircraft would attack the battlecruiser at heights below and the ceiling of the 130 mm was far in excess of that. He also ordered a reduction in the light anti-aircraft guns believing that its escorts would defend it. This design was approved by the Council of Ministers on 25 March 1950.McLaughlin, pp. 109–110
This allowed the technical design process to begin and it was completed in December 1950. Reviews by the Navy and Shipbuilding Ministries in February 1951 led to some significant changes to the design in April. The original form of the bow was similar to that of the Chapayev-class light cruisers, but sea trials of the lead ship of that class in December 1950 – January 1951 proved that she was very wet forward, which hindered her seakeeping ability. The Stalingrads bow form was radically altered with a much more raked stem, its sheer and flare were greatly increased and the ship gained almost in length, possibly in response to the Chapayevs problems. In addition the thickness of her belt armor was increased from , possibly in response to weight savings elsewhere. This final design was submitted for approval on 4 June 1951, but preparations for the working design drawings began before it was approved.McLaughlin, p. 110
Design General characteristics The ships of the Stalingrad class were long at the waterline, and long overall. They had a beam of , a maximum draft of forward, aft, and displaced at standard load and at full load. They were the first large Soviet-built ships with a flush deck. The hull was completely welded to save weight and they used longitudinal framing throughout. Metacentric height was estimated at , presumably in the design load condition. The ships had a triple bottom underneath the armored citadel that had a height of and 23 main watertight compartments. They had a crew of 1712 men plus space for 30 when acting as a flagship.McLaughlin, pp. 110–111, 115
The cost for each ship was estimated at 1.168 billion rubles, almost four times the 322 million rubles for a Sverdlov-class cruiser. The ship was intended to be commanded by a rear admiral, with its executive officer, political officer and the heads of the gunnery and engineering divisions as captains 1st rank.
Propulsion