The Belgian stay-behind network, colloquially called "Gladio" (meaning "sword"), was a secret mixed civilian and military unit, trained to form a resistance movement in the event of a Soviet invasion and part of a network of similar organizations in North Atlantic Treaty Organization states. It functioned from at least 1951 until 1990, when the Belgian branch was promptly and officially dissolved after its existence became publicly known following revelations concerning the Italian branch of the stay-behind network.
History
The history of the Belgian branch of the Gladio network starts in 1948 when Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak and Minister of Justice Paul Struye gave the Staatsveiligheid (State Security Service) permission to discuss with allied intelligence services the organization of a clandestine stay-behind network. These negotiations mainly happened with Sir Stewart Menzies of the British SIS and representatives of the then freshly founded CIA. The explicit objectives of this collaboration were outlined in a top-secret letter from Menzies to Spaak:
The amount of influence at this early stage, accredited to the CIA varies from source to source. CIA did not yet have full authority over the Office of Policy Coordination, which directed U.S. covert action until 1952. During the initial negotiations Menzies proposed to keep the US out of the organization, but Spaak objected to further developments not being in a tripartite (Belgium–Great-Britain–United States) or multilateral setting. In the final report of the parliamentary inquiry there is little mention of CIA involvement, but investigative journalist points, based on Pentagon documents, at the CIA's significant early organizational role and de facto control until 1968.11/12/13-06-1991, De Morgen Similarly, Colonel Margot complains in an internal note, dated April 8, 1959, about the influence of the US intelligence services on the Belgian branch of the Gladio-network.
These initial negotiations led to closer collaboration between the three countries' secret services under the name Tripartite Meeting Belgium. Following this meeting, the Belgian stay-behind network became operational, but it was not until January 4, 1952, that the first formal instructions for stay-behind operations were issued to (Staatsveiligheid) and General Etienne Baele.Gijsels (1991), p. 69.
Growing polarization between East and West and awareness of the need for continental collaboration led to the foundation in 1949 of the Comité Clandestin de l'Union Occidentale (C.C.U.O.), which contained Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Great-Britain. The C.C.U.O. laid the base for the formation of the NATO and coordinated the various stay-behind networks in the five member countries.Gijsels, pg. 68 Its functions were transferred to the Clandestine Planning Committee (C.P.C.), another NATO-organization in 1951, which was renamed in to Coordination and Planning Committee in 1959.Parlementaire Commissie (1991), p. 20. The C.P.C. elaborated a plan for installing two taskgroups, one for communications and one for secret networks, a structure reflected in the Allied Coordination Committee (A.C.C.) founded in 1958 to relieve the C.P.C. of some of its tasks.
The A.C.C. consisted of the members of the C.C.U.O. plus the US and coordinated the stay-behind activities, as was stipulated on its first meeting in April 1959 under French supervision:
These interlocking coordination organizations, like the C.P.C. and A.C.C, were initially headquartered in Paris, but moved along with SHAPE, NATO's central headquarters, to Mons in Belgium after the French withdrawal from NATO's unified command structure in 1966. After the initial six counties, Germany, Italy, Denmark and Norway became members of the A.C.C.. Though all of the counties were members of NATO, an official link between the A.C.C and NATO was denied. The parliamentary committee noted "... one can not do away with the impression that in practice closer and closer relations did come to exist".Parlementaire Commissie (1991), p. 21
In the following decades the stay-behind activities were mainly coordinated through A.C.C.-meetings. These activities consisted officially of (multinational) training activities like infiltration, parachute jumping and long range communications, of which numerous were held at least between 1972 and 1989.Gijsels (1991), pg. 71 Due to the secretive nature of the network, the milieu of various operatives involved and the Cold War setting, allegations were raised that the stay-behind network was during this time also at least indirectly involved with clandestine actions on Belgian soil. The last documented meeting of the A.C.C took place on 23 and 24 October 1990 under supervision of General Van Calster, where the participants discussed a.o. a scaling-back of the stay-behind network in light of changing international relations.
This was the meeting that Italian president Giulio Andreotti was referring to following the October 24, 1990 revelation of the existence of Gladio in Italy, a revelations several others governments' spokespersons reacted to by claiming that any stay-behind in their own country was history. This only exasperated Andreotti, who declared to the press that the last stay-behind meeting had taken place in Belgium a few days ago. After the exposure of the Italian branch and inquiries by Italian officials to their Belgian counterparts, Defense minister Guy Coëme and Prime Minister Wilfried Martens made the existence of the Belgian section of the Gladio-network public in a press meeting on November 7, 1990.
The government decided on November 23, 1990, a few days after the proposition for a parliamentary investigation to officially disband the network.
Organization, activities and resources
The Belgian Gladio-branch consisted of two separate sections:
S.D.R.A VIII (, "Documentation, Information and Action Service VIII"), residing under the military intelligence service, the Belgian General Information and Security Service (S.G.R) and thus the minister of Defense. S.T.C/Mob.S.T.C/Mob. was renamed on November 1, 1990 to D.15, but most sources keep referring to its old name. ( "Training, Communication and Documentation Service"), residing under the Staatsveiligheid and thus the minister of Justice.
S.D.R.A VIII was one of the sections of S.D.R.A (military security service), which in its turn is part of the S.G.R. (general military intelligence and security service). The S.G.R's functions are formally described in a decree from 1989 and are twofold: intelligence gathering and ensuring the security of military personnel and installations, issuing clearances, etc. The S.D.R.A is mandated with the second task, and is dived into functional sections: for instance, S.D.R.A III is contra-infiltration (for S.D.R.A XI, see further).
The members of S.D.R.A VIII were military personnel, trained in unorthodox warfare, combat and sabotage, parachute jumping and maritime operations.Ganser... The operatives were trained to accompany the government abroad in case of a Soviet invasion, and then establish liaisons with the Belgian resistance movement and engage in warfare.
Oversight
During the parliamentary investigation, the committee stumbled by chance on the existence of the Coordination and Planning Committee secretariat, which formed S.D.R.A XI, but was funded through secret NATO payments. When Paul Detrembleur, former head of the S.D.R.A and last administrator of S.D.R.A XI/C.P.C.-secretariat, was called to testify before the parliamentary inquiry about the activities of this section about the Gladio-activities, he refused to divulge any information.Parlementaire Commissie (1991), p. 22.Gijsels (1991), pp. 69-70
The final parliamentary report stressed the resulting incomplete insight into the functioning of the C.P.C. and its relation to S.D.R.A. VIII, which formally organized the military section of the Gladio network. The report noted that the C.P.C. was responsible for the relations between the Belgian secret services and the NATO high command (especially SHAPE), and that the witnesses denied being involved with stay-behind activities. The reason was, the latter claimed, that NATO was "forward defending"-oriented and thus not interested in stay-behind activities in countries like Belgium, which did not border Warsaw Pact-nations. The commission then further noted the discrepancy between these claims and given reason, and the fact that the C.P.C. co-coordinated the S.D.R.A. VIII and participated in the A.C.C.-meetings.Parlementaire Commissie (1991), p. 23.
S.T.C/Mob. function and oversight
The civilian branch of the Belgian stay-behind had the mission to collect intelligence under conditions of enemy occupation which could be useful to the government and to organize secure communication routes to evacuate the members of the government and other people with official functions.
Military trainers/operatives and civilian operatives
Recruitment (how, criteria) Training activities (joint international training/war games, sabotage, intelligence ....) Funding (equipment) Weapons, weapons-depots.
Both military intelligence and Staatsveiligheid maintained dossiers on Gladio training activities, of which incomplete versions were made available to the parliamentary committee. Events from the list of operations by the military branch was provided by Coëme and is denoted by A, while events from the list from the archives of the Staatsveiligheid (titled "Overzicht oefeningen in het kader ACC – periode 1980-1990") is denoted by B:
(A) 1972: Training on clandestine techniques. (A) 1976: Training on radio-communications, intelligence, maritime operations, aerial operations and escape routes. (A) 1977: Training on optimizing techniques to locate downed pilots and the use of escape routes. (A) 1978: In-door training on clandestine missions. (A) 1980: Training on parachute-jumping, long-distance radio communication and clandestine techniques. (B) June 1980: OREGAN II (A) 1981: Lessons and training on clandestine activities. (A) 1983: Training on escape routes, intelligence, aerial operations and radio communications. (A) 1985: Six trainings (at least two outside Belgium, one in Belgium): infiltration a parachute-jumping, extracting material through escape routes. (A) 1986, 1987 & 1988: : Trainings outside Belgium on intelligence operations and radio communications.
Minister Melchior Wathelet testified before the parliamentary inquiry that secret weapon depots were created in the 1950s, of which a first one was discovered in 1957 due to a landslide, and a second one in 1959 by playing children. He further stated that after these discoveries it was decided to abandon the depots and transfer the weapons to a military depot. An inventory report, dated 1991, for the military section of Gladio mentions inflatable boats, video-equipment and around 300 weapons, including M1 carbines, MP40 submachine guns and "armes en cocon", weapons packaged for long-term storage.Gijsels (1991), pg. 89
Parliamentary inquiry
Overview