Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Charles Doveton Sturdee, 1st Baronet (9 June 18597 May 1925) was a Royal Navy officer. After training as a torpedo officer, he commanded two different cruisers and then three different battleships before becoming commander of the 1st Battle Squadron of the Home Fleet. He went on to command the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and then the 2nd Cruiser Squadron.
Just before the start of the First World War Sturdee became Chief of War Staff at the Admiralty. In November 1914 the Royal Navy suffered a serious defeat at the Battle of Coronel. In response Sturdee, recently sacked from his job at the Admiralty, was sent to the South Atlantic to seek out the German squadron, commanded by Graf Maximilian von Spee, which had caused the damage at Coronel. On 8 December 1914, while coaling at Stanley, Sturdee encountered von Spee and the subsequent action became known as the Battle of the Falkland Islands. Von Spee, finding that he was engaged with a superior force, was forced to flee. In the course of the pursuit Sturdee's forces sank almost the entire German squadron. Only one light cruiser escaped but she was hunted down in March 1915.
In the closing years of the war Sturdee served as commander of the 4th Battle Squadron in the Grand Fleet and then as Commander-in-Chief, The Nore.
Early life Born the son of Captain Frederick Sturdee RN and Anna Frances Sturdee (née Hodson) in Charlton, Kent, Sturdee was educated at the Royal Naval School at New Cross and then joined the Royal Navy as a cadet in the training ship HMS Britannia on 15 July 1871. Promoted to midshipman on 19 July 1873, he was appointed to the frigate , flagship of the China Station in 1876.Heathcote, p. 238 Promoted to sub-lieutenant on 9 June 1878 and to lieutenant on 7 February 1880, he joined the brig at Portsmouth in May 1880 and then transferred to the torpedo depot ship in the Mediterranean Fleet in February 1881. He took part in the bombardment of Alexandria in July 1882 during the Anglo-Egyptian War.
Early naval career After completing a course on torpedoes at Sturdee became a torpedo officer on , flagship of the North America and West Indies Station, in 1886 before returning to HMS Vernon as an instructor in 1889. Promoted to commander on 30 June 1893, he transferred to the Admiralty as a torpedo specialist in the Directorate of Naval Ordnance. He became commanding officer of the cruiser on the Australian Station in November 1897 and became involved in managing the tensions with Germany and the United States over the Samoan Islands in 1899. His handling of this situation, which involved a tense stand-off with the German representatives, earned him his promotion to captain on 30 June 1899, and his appointment as a Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George in the 1900 New Year Honours list on 1 January 1900 (he was invested in person by Queen Victoria at Windsor Castle on 1 March 1900).
Senior office Sturdee returned to the Admiralty as assistant director of naval intelligence (foreign division) from 1 January 1900, serving as such until 16 October 1902, when he was appointed to command of the protected cruiser . Appointed a member, 4th class, of the Royal Victorian Order (MVO) on 21 April 1903 during King Edward's visit to Malta, he became commanding officer of the armoured cruiser in the Home Fleet in November 1903. He went on to be commanding officer of the battleship and Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet (Lord Charles Beresford) in May 1905.Heathcote, p. 239 Advanced to Commander of the Royal Victorian Order on 16 April 1906, he became commanding officer of the battleship and then of the battleship in a new role as Chief of Staff of the Channel Fleet in 1907. He was appointed an aide-de-camp to the King on 26 October 1907. He was promoted to rear-admiral on 12 September 1908.
Sturdee wrote (9 March 1909) to Jack Sandars, an adviser to the Opposition leader Arthur Balfour, expressing doubt that the 10,000 yard range of HMS Dreadnought’s 12-inch guns would be of much use, as visibility did not extend more than 6,000 yards in the North Sea on 25 days out of 30. He appears at that time to have favoured caution before committing too many resources to all-big-gun battleships.Lambert 2002, p.214 Historian Nicholas Lambert writes that “a self-proclaimed naval intellectual, Sturdee was the disciple of Reginald Custance [who had been his boss as Director of Naval Intelligence] and former flag captain to Lord Charles Beresford. Sturdee’s pomposity and arrogance combined with his close association with Beresford earned him the enmity of Admiral Sir John Fisher, who tried hard to sabotage his career." Although no longer First Sea Lord, Fisher wrote (1 Feb 1910) to First Lord of the Admiralty Reginald McKenna urging him not to appoint Sturdee Third Sea Lord.Lambert 2012, pp.283-5 He became Rear Admiral commanding the 1st Battle Squadron of the Home Fleet, with his flag in the battleship , in 1910.
Sturdee became President of the Submarine Committee of the Admiralty in early 1911. He benefited from the decision by the incoming First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, in late 1911 to pass over twenty admirals to promote John Jellicoe to command of the 2nd Battle Squadron, freeing up a promotion logjam. Sturdee became commander of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron of the Home Fleet, with his flag in the cruiser , in December 1911. He went on to become commander of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron of the Home Fleet, with his flag in Shannon again, in 1913. He was appointed a Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath on 3 June 1913.
First World War Chief of War Staff Sturdee was promoted to vice-admiral on 13 December 1913. By the end of 1913 Sturdee was considered for the position of Chief of Admiralty War Staff. Draft notes in Churchill’s papers suggest that he may have been the second choice after Prince Louis of Battenberg had given what Nicholas Lambert describes as “uncharacteristically fierce resistance” to appointing his former superior Reginald Custance. Heathcote states that he took office as Chief of War Staff at the Admiralty in July 1914.
On 24 July 1914 Sturdee submitted two memos deploring the new planned “HMS Polyphemus” class, a semi-submerged torpedo cruiser armed with eight torpedoes. There had been an argument about the naval estimates at the start of 1914, with Liberal opinion, including Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George, objecting to ever-escalating naval expenditure, especially with a general election due within a year or so. Churchill’s motives were purely financial, aiming to save up to £900,000 off the naval budget, and his plans had been outlined in memos on 1 and 14 June 1914. He aimed to substitute 14-16 submarines for a planned "HMS Resistance" and 6-8 Polyphemuses for a planned "HMS Agincourt" (the name was reused for a different battleship), and to cease all destroyer building except for two or three large ones for use as flotilla leaders, and build submarines instead.Lambert 2002, pp.300-1 Sturdee criticised the high cost of the Polyphemuses, as well as their low freeboard (making them unusable in rough seas) and vulnerability to enemy destroyers. Christopher Bell writes that, contrary to Nicholas Lambert's claims, no final decision had been reached on “substitution” (of submersible craft for battleships) prior to the outbreak of war.Bell presents no evidence that any of this was anything to do with the imminence of war (war was about to break out in the Balkans (see July Crisis), but it was not clear until early August that Britain would be involved). Rather, it was part of the renewed fallout over the January 1914 naval estimates.Bell 2012, p.47
On 9 August 1914, with Britain now at war with Germany, Churchill instructed Battenberg and Sturdee to draw up plans to seize Ameland in the Dutch Frisian Islands. This was the genesis of the eventual plan to land at Borkum (as a possible prelude to seizing the Kiel Canal and sending a British fleet into the Baltic.Bell 2017, p.22, p. 373 Bell gives the date of Churchill's Ameland instruction as 8 August in his text then 9 August in a footnote.Bell 2012, p.51
Sturdee objected (16 August 1914) to the Order in Council about blocking trade with Germany through neutral countries. He doubted the “political expediency of adopting an attitude the practical efficacy of which is very doubtful, and which I think is just as sure to raise trouble with neutrals”. Admiral Edmond Slade recorded similar thoughts on 18 August.Lambert 2012, p.225
Sturdee wrote two “dismissive minutes” (25 September 1914) about the Cabinet’s wishes to mine the eastern North Sea as far south as Rotterdam and Flushing. Nicholas Lambert comments that Sturdee “a self-proclaimed naval theorist of the Mahanian school, was notorious for his monochromatic view of sea power and his dogmatic insistence that the primary objective must remain decisive victory in a fleet engagement”. Captain Herbert Richmond complained in his diary that “he produced the old, stale claptrap that what we want to do is not to keep the enemy in but to get him out & fight”. While Churchill was away at Antwerp Sturdee had persuaded the First Sea Lord Prince Louis of Battenberg to join him in a joint statement that it was not British policy to lay mines (the document is not in the archives, according to Nicholas Lambert – it is only mentioned in the 1 October diary of Captain Philip Dumas, the “Director of Mining”). Churchill (1 October) ordered the Admiralty to draw up a schedule for mining the North Sea, reconfirming instructions given by Prime Minister H.H. Asquith while he was away at Antwerp.Lambert 2012, pp.261-2
In Nicholas Lambert's view Sturdee shared some of the blame for Admiralty blunders for which Churchill was blamed by the press – the escape of the Goeben and Breslau, and the loss of the Aboukir, Cressy and Hogue. Christopher Bell writes that Churchill, who had vainly urged that the three cruisers be stationed more safely further away from the German fleet, was unfairly blamed in the press. He had appointed Battenberg and Sturdee and so bears some responsibility for their errors, but nonetheless the fault for the loss of the three cruisers lies with them.Bell 2017, p.31 On 1 November 1914 the Royal Navy suffered a demoralising defeat when it lost two armoured cruisers commanded by Christopher Cradock at the Battle of Coronel.Massie, p. 248 In The World Crisis (his First World War memoirs, published in the 1920s) Churchill later put the blame for Coronel on Cradock (to the displeasure of his surviving relatives); in Bell's view he should have been more critical of Battenberg and Sturdee for failure to transmit clear orders.Bell 2017, p.3o8
Admiral Fisher, returning as First Sea Lord in Battenberg's place, sacked Sturdee (4 November) – he was “the first to go” in Nicholas Lambert’s words. Stephen Roskill (in Man of Secrets, his biography of Maurice Hankey) described this as personal “headhunting” by Fisher. However Nicholas Lambert comments that Captain Philip Dumas wrote in his diary on the day of Fisher’s return (30 October) that “the great hope here is for Sturdee & Leveson to go”. “Blinker” Hall also thought similarly.Lambert 2012, pp.292.3
South Atlantic
Admiral Lord Fisher sent a squadron commanded by Sturdee, with his flag in the battlecruiser , to the South Atlantic to seek out the German squadron, commanded by Graf Maximilian von Spee, which had won the Battle of Coronel. Sturdee was given command at Winston Churchill’s insistence, because he did not at that time wish him to be scapegoated for Admiralty failings. Halpern comments that the decision was compounded by the fact that Fisher "detested" Sturdee and wanted to remove him from the Admiralty.Halpern, p. 247